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CONGLOMERATING ANTITRUST POLICY BY 
COMPARATIVE EXAMPLE: 
A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF MERGER REGULATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN, AND THE EUROPEAN UNION 
* Jonathan T Trexler 
It is all too easy to allow the C/:l' of' "cliitural differences" to hecome the 
universal apologetic that permanently sheathes the statlls quo against criticism 
based UPOIl comparative example. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
John H. Langbein. The Gerl/l{1Il 
Adl'allfage ill Ciri! Procedure. 52 U. 
Ctll. L. RFV. 823, 855 (1985). 
Unitcd States jurisprudence has profoundly impacted Japanese and 
European Union antitrust laws since their incipiency. I Where American competi-
tion law fails or falters, however, there arc Icssons that the Unitcd States too can 
draw from its foreign counterparts. Hence, the mutual and reciprocal exchange 
of merger policies will improve enforcement in all three regions and strengthen 
market competition overall. In the aftermath of the Enron debacle. America's 
eyes must be wide open to corporate abuses of industrial power; its current 
mechanisms ofaccountability rcsult in somc disappointmcnt and it must look for 
alternatives to makc certain that past failures do not recur. 
* Jonathan Trexler is an attorney with Thomas & Associates, P.A .. practicing in the areas of commer-
cial litigation and real estate law. Mr. Trexler received a B.A. Irom Gustavus Adolphus College and alD., 
II1l1gllll CI/II1 lal/d£" from Hamline University School of Law, where he was Managing Editor of the Hall1lille Lmr 
RIc'!'ie\\'. The author would like to thank his mother, Theresa A. Trexler. 
I MITSl'O MIIISl,SIIIIA. l'iTROI)JICnOri 10 JA"A:-.IFS". AriTlMO:-.JOPOLY LA\\' 2 (1990). BI/I see Spencer 
Weber Waller. Ullderslalldillg allil Apprl'cialillg EC COll1p£'lilioll IAIH', hi ANn rRlIS r L..I. 55 (1992) (explaining 
how the parallels drawn between the EC Treaty and American antitrust law are overstated, and that the two 
regulatory schemes lie on fundamentally different principles). 
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Admittcdly, it is unreasonable to transplant an entire body of law from 
one country to another and expect the results to be the same. Law docs not cxist 
in isolation from thc culturcs and societics that it governs, so any comparative 
approach to solving societal problems must be viewed with adequate skepticism, 
or at least with due regard for thc fundamcntal diffcrcnccs among culturcs and 
societies. 2 
Provincial notions of "natural law" as a brooding, omniprcscnt body of 
absolute rights and ideals of justice arc incrcasingly bcing rejcctcd,' as pragma-
tists demonstrate that law serves primarily as a tool to effectuate necessary social 
changes:+ Some of thc benefits of comparative law includc acccss to a diverse 
pool of idcas and policy considcrations, bcttcr institutional cooperation among 
diffcrent socictics (which invariably rcsults from thc increascd borrowing and 
lending of idcas), and morc globally informcd lawycrs, judges, legislators, and 
citizens.s 
2 Taken to the extremc, Savigny urgcd that law is peculiar to each nation and cannot bc rcalistically 
compared. W. FRlrf)~IANN, LHiAI THE()R\ 210 II (5th cd. 19(7). However, this blanket prcmisc is almost 
universally rejected in the intcrnational legal community. S~~ .Illl.lllS S IO"E, LHi.\1. S\ S 1,,:V1 A"ll L\\\ YcRS' 
RL\SONIN(iS 53 (1964); H . .I. Berman, 7h~ Comparisoll of SOI'il!! alld .·Imaiull/ Lcm, 34 l'ill. L..I. 559, 559 n.2 
( 1959). 
3 Se~, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (interpreting the Erie doc/rille, which 
acknowledged state common law as a distinct legal entity, rather than as the mere application of universal 
reason to cases and controversies). This articulation comes Irom Sowlwl'Il Pacific CO. I'. JeIlS(!II, 244 U.S. 205, 
222 ( 1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articu-
late voice of sOllle sovereign .... "). 
4 Bulsel! RudolfB. Schlesingcr. The Nalure o/(j~IlI!/'(/1 Prillcipll!s of La\l', ill RAPPORIS Gtl\f,RALX 
All VIE COl\liRES lNTER"ATlot-<AI. m DROll ('OMI'ARI 235,257 60,269 (Limpcns cd., 1964) (outlining thc 
pragmatic reasons for linding core principles ofagreemcnt among world legal systems). Many legal realists like 
Jerome Frank have used comparative law in conncction with lcgal and social rct(mn. SI!I! United States v. 
Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 587 92 (2d ('if. 1956) (Flank, .I., dissenting), rel,'d, 353 U.S. 391 (1957). 
5 For an example of how many countries' laws can be examincd to arrivc at a just result, see 
GreellSpilll I'. Slilll!, 97 A.2d 390 (N.J. Sup. Cl. 1951) (holding that a parcnt is liable I(ll' the ncccssaries of her 
minor child, after examining the German, French, and Italian civil codes, among others). 
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Antitrust law presents an especially valuable opportunity for interna-
tional cooperation and bon-owing because of the importance of comity in 
enforcement and the need to avoid inconsistent standards.6 Multinational 
corporations are frequently the targets of merger regulations because of their 
potential of acquiring a monopoly (or a "dominant position" in EU jargon7). 
These companies may not be able to operate competitively if faced with varying 
or inconsistent directives from the regulatory agencies of several different 
countries or blocs.R 
The first three sections of this article will provide a historical and 
theoretical background of merger regulation in the United States, the European 
Union, and Japan, respectively. They will also outline the standards to which 
mergers are held and the institutional mechanisms to which the enforcement of 
merger regulation is entrusted. Throughout, this article will draw comparisons 
and make distinctions between these systems. Finally, this study offers lessons 
6 See British Nylon Spinners. Ltd. v. Imperial Chem. Indus .. 1953 Ch. 19 (U.K. C.A.) (refusing to 
defer to a U.S. judgment. which had adjudicated a U.K. patent unenforceable for violating Shennan Act section 
I, on the grounds that thc District Court of New York had asserted extraterritorial jurisdiction under the '"effects 
doctrine'"): Otto Kahn-Freund. Note. 1:'lIglish COlllmcts IIl1d AmericIIII Allli-Trusl Lml" - The ,VdOIl Plllelll CIISI!, 
IX MOIlI'RN L. RlV. 65. ()7 70 (1955) (arguing that the enforcement of U.S. antitrust law extraterritorially 
'"cannot be justified hom an international point of view'"). 811t s"e RLs IMcME'H (TIlIRIl) OF TilL FORcl(;;-': 
RELMIONS LA\\, OF 1m Ur\llIll STAlES ~ 402 (19R7) (setting forth a sehcme under which a U.S. court may, in 
certain situations. have legitimate jurisdiction to prescribe its law to conduct outside the territory of the United 
States '"that has or is intended to have substantial efTect within its territory"). 
7 TRbY1Y ESLYfliISIIIN<i IHI EL'ROI'I.AN CmIMliNIIY. art. RI. Nov. 10. 1997. 0..1. (C 340) 3 (1997) 
[hereinafter EC TREAI Y I. 
8 Because of the internationalization of commerce. partially attributablc to the WTO and GATT. 
thcre has becn cxtensive advocacy fix an international antitrust regime or '"World Competition Cod c." Sl'e LEON 
BRlrTAr\, El,ROPE: THE EUROPE WE NI-Hl 163 (1994): Yun-Peng Chu. TOll"(m/s the Eslllh/ishmelll of"lI11 Order 
of" COlllp<'lilion liJl' Ihe IlIlernaliOlwl Ecollomy: /1'/111 Reler",!ces 10 tile Dm/i IlIIernalional Alllilrust Code, Ihe 
Parallel Imports Prohiem, (/1/(1 IllI! Erperiellce of" raill"<11/, ROC, ill INTERNATIONAL HARMOI'iILAIION OF 
CO~IPETITlO\J Lo\ws 453 (C-l. Cheng ct al. cds .. 1995); Eleanor M. Fox. Compelitioll L(/\\' (/nd Ill" Agenda liJr 
the wro: FO/gillg Ill" Links 01 Comp<'lilion alld Trw/", 4 PAC. RIM L. & PO['y .T. I (1995): Emst-Ulrich 
Petersmann. Proposals lor Negolialillg IlIlemaliollal COlllp<'litioll Rilles ill Ille G.·ITT-IITO World Trade alld 
Legal S1"I<'lIl. 49 AlISSE\J\\IRISCIlMI 231 (199-+). 
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that each system can take from the others, and points out areas that rcqUlre 
special attention in all three merger regimes. 
II. MERGER RECiULATION IN TilE UNITED STATES 
Antitrust law in the United States began as a result of a political 
movement aimed at restraining the power of large trusts, which were seen as a 
form of factionalism that posed a threat to libelty. This fear of large businesses 
that were unaccountable to the general public stemmed from the beginning of the 
Union.9 Such concems came to the forefront in 1890, when the Sherman Act was 
promulgated in response to unprecedented trends toward wealth concentration, 10 
corporate mismanagement, and the unethical exercise of corporate power. I I 
9 Alier the American Revolution, Virginia and other states included in their bills of rights such 
statements as: "IN]o man, or set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments or priviicges from the 
community." Va. Bill of Rights ~ 4 (1776); "I N 10 man, or set of men arc entitled to exclusive public emoluments 
or privileges Ii-om the community." COr\N. Cot-.s I. art. I, ~ I (I X I X); "No man, nor corporation, or association 
of men, have any other title to obtain advantages, or particular and exclusive privileges, distinct Ii-om those of 
the community." MASS. CONS I. pt. I, art. (, (I7XO). Thomas .Icfferson advocated the inclusion of similar 
language in the fedcral Bill of Rights. Letter from Thomas JetTerson to James Madison (Dec. 20. 1787), ill 5 
THE WORKS OF THO\IAS JeHcRSO!'l 368. 371 (Ford cd .. 19(4). For a more thorough legislativc history of the 
Sherman Act and its philosophical and popUlist underpinnings, see William L. Lctwin, COllgre.l's alld Ihe 
SllI!l'IJlIJil Alllitrusl LitH'. 1887-18<)0, 23 U. CHI. L. REV _ 121 (1956)_ 
10 This issue has not been resolved. SI!I! Thl! Roll! o(Gialll CorporaliollS ill Ihe ,/III('I'ic(II/ alld HI)!'ld 
Ecollolllil!.I': Pa!'1 2 COIjJo}'([le Sl!crecl': 01'('I'l'iel\·.I': ffl!ll!'illg.l' Bej;)/'{' Ihl! SII/JCOIllIll. Oil MOIIOjJoll' oj'th(' Sell!c/ 
COlllmilll!1! Oil Small BIIsille.l's, 92d Cong. 1042 (1971) (statement of Senator Nelson) (noting that some corpora-
tions arc much larger in economic terms than the states in which they arc incorporated, like Standard Oil Co. 
of New Jersey, the annual revenuc of which is more than fi.lllr times the combined revenues of that state and all 
its local governments): RICHARD J. BARBeR, THle A~,"_RICAN CORPORAl ION: Irs POIIER, liS MONEeY, Irs POLlIICS 
19--21 (1970) (demonstrating in 1970 that the one hundred largest manufacturing lirms represent about as much 
wealth and economic activity as the 300,000 next largest firms). 
II SI!L' Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 28X U.S. 517, 54X 65 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(describing the historical concern that unrestricted corporations would lead to "encroachment upon the liberties 
and opportunities of the individual," "the subjection of labor to capital," monopoly, "scandals and finoritism," 
or sonlC other '''insidious 111cnacc inhercnt in large aggregations of capital," and pronolillcing that: 
The typical business corporation of the la~t century, owned by a small group of 
individuals. managed by their owners, and limited in size by their per'l"Hd wealth, is 
being supplanted by huge concerns in which the lives of tens or hundrcds of 
thousands of employees and the property of tens or hundreds of thousands of 
investors arc subjected, through the corporate mechanism, to the control of a few 
men, 
the elfects of which "lead [able. discerningJ scholars to compare the evolving 'corporate system' with the feudal 
system; and to lead other men of insight and experience to assert that this 'master institution of civilised life' 
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As illustrated in United States 1'. Wins/(})t"I:' however, section I of the 
Sherman Act was insufficient as a check on mergers hecause a showing of 
resultant overwhelming market concentration alone did not create a sufficient 
bar without an overt anticompetitive act. 13 Section 7 of the Clayton Act was 
passed in 1914 and covered the acquisition of the another company's stoCk. 14 
This was amended in 1950 by the Celler-Kefauver Act and again in 1980 and 
1984, making it illegal for any "person" (whether natural or legal) to: 
[acquire] the stock or ... the whole or any part of the assets 
of one or more persons engaged in commerce [where] in any 
line of commerce [in] any section of the country [the effect of 
the merger may be] substantially to lessen competition, or 
tend to create a monopoly. 15 
This language gives courts the power to analyze the efTects of a merger on the 
market and thoroughly weigh relevant policies to adjudicate in the public 
intcrest. 
A. Prima Facie !/legality Under Clayton Act Section 7 
Qucstions arising under section 7 usually turn on the definition of the 
relevant market, requiring courts to decide what "line of commerce" in which 
[the corporation I is committing I society I to the rulc of a plutocracy"); Johnny Roberts & Evan Thomas, £111"011 ,i-
Dirll' LU//lldn'. N[\\,S\HFK. Mar. II. 2002. at 22 (depicting the excessiveness of a corporate culture which, 
unmindtlJl of its consequcnces to powerless. dispersed constituencies, led to the Enron debacle); Allan Sloan & 
Mark Hosenball. Fo/// 7h)/{h/e for ;/I/(/er.\"ell, N[·.WS\\'UcK, Mar. 25,2002, at 34 (detailing the federal indictment 
of the Arthur Andersen accounting tinn, which alleges that the company's partncrs instructed its employecs to 
shrcd documents and delete computer tiles that contained intixmation incriminating Enron executives), 
12227 U,S. 202 (1913) (holding that Sherman Act scction I did not prohibit mcrgers and the 
consequent wealth concentration without a showing of an overt anticompetitivc act). 
13 S('(' id. 
14 See illtl'll note 49. 
15 Clayton Act ~ 7,15 U.s.c. ~ IX (2004). 
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"section of the country" might be affected, or on the substantiality of the compet-
itive restraint that would ensue from allowing the merger. 
As in other areas of antitrust law, an atTected "line of commerce,"I!> can 
be defined by looking to the reasonable interchangeability of products. However, 
less showing of interchangeability is required under section 7 than under typical 
Shennan Act cases. l? One of the problems inherent in the interchangeability test 
is what has become known as the "cellophane fallacy," to which the majority 
decision in United States v. E.!. dll POllt de Nemours & Co. IX originally fell 
victim. In that case, the United States Supreme Court found that E.!. du Pont's 
exclusive manufacturing of cellophane did not constitute a monopoly in any 
relevant market because if it were to raise its price, many consumers would 
switch to competing packaging materials as shown by market data.ll) The enor 
in the Court's reasoning is based on the fact that there is some point at which the 
price of a monopolized product is high enough that consumers will switeh to 
other products, even if those altemative products are not reasonably interchange-
16 For example. the Shennan Act section 2 requires an in-depth definition of the product market 
relevant to the alleged monopolization. See. e.g., Uniled Slalcs v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (finding 
that "ccntral slat ion" sccurity services operated in a separate market from othcr property protection services); 
Int'l Boxing Club v. United States, 358 U.S. 243 (1959) (finding that the championship boxing market was 
distinguishable hom the general boxing markel and was being scparately monopolized); United Stalcs v. E.1. 
du Pont de Ncmours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956) (finding thai cellophanc was interchangeable wilh other 
tlexible packaging products and did nol constitute its own product market); Syufy Enters. v. Am. Muiticincma, 
Inc., 793 F.2d 990 (91h Cir. 1(86), ('crl. dmicd, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) (finding lhat a ralional jury could 
conclude thai industry anticipated top-grossing films constitute a distincl market from other first-run films); 
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1(45) (finding that virgin ingot and secondary 
ingot were not in the same market for purposes of calculating monopoly power). 
- 17 CO/llpare United States v. Conl'l Can Co., 3n U.S. 441 (1964) (barring a CanlllallUfilclurcr's 
acqlli~ition of a jar manufacturer, in spite of the obvious limitations to the interchangeability of the products). 
lI'ith (i,'ll1l1ell, 3X4 u.s. at 563 (making finc markct distinctions bct\vecll types of security ~crvi<:cs in applying 
the Shennan Act). 
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able.20 So long as a defendant company's price for its product is set just below 
this level, market studies show that consumers will switch products if the price 
increased. 21 This, of course, gives the impression that these products are 
interchangeable and there is no domination of the market by the company when 
in reality the company is already reaping monopoly profits. 
The Department of Justice (DOJ) utilizes the "hypothetical monopolist" 
approach to define the relevant line of commerce in merger analysis. 22 The 
DOl's Guidelines ask whether a hypothetical monopolist in a proposed market 
could profitably impose a small but significant and nontransitory increase in 
price (SSNIP).n Ifa monopolist could raise the price by five percent without the 
entry of new competitors or product substitution by consumers, the market is 
correctly defined. 24 This test is flawed for the same simple reason as is the test 
ordained by the Supreme Court in E.I. du POllt: it contemplates a rise in price 
from the current rate, which may already be a monopolistic one. 
The Supreme Court treats the "section of the country" inquiry of Clayton 
Act section 7 as the relevant geographic market, or "within the area of competi-
tive overlap, [where] the effect of the merger on competition will be direct and 
immediate."2) The Court has, in some cases, found that there is more than one 
20 Si!i! gowra/h' Thomas G. Krattenlllaker et aI., MOllopo/\' POll'('/' (///(/ Marki!t POI1'(T ill Alltitrust 
LiII\" 76 GHl. L.J. 241 (19n). 
21 Si!i! it! 
22 .)I!I! U.S. [)IP·\RI~IFNI Ill' .IllsllcL & FTC .101;;1 HORI/O"'·\I MFRI;J'R GUlf)rt INFS ~ I.n (1992) 
lhcrcinatlcr MIRldR CilllllLLI"I·sl. 
23 Sn'id. ~ 1.11. 
24 S('(! ill. 
25 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Hank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963). 
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relevant geographic market for the product in which competition may be 
lessened by the acquisition. 26 The trend, however, seems to be toward finding a 
single geographic market for each product. 27 
Section 7 was enacted to attack potcntially anti competitive combinations 
in their incipiency, rather than fragmenting an already concentrated or monopo-
lized markeP (a task for which the Sherman Act was designated). Since United 
States merger regulation is designed to work preventatively, courts must work 
with probabilities instead of certainties. 29 While this method is often criticized 
for its tendency to allow judges and enforcement agencies to engage in conjec-
ture and economic speculation when deciding how markets will function after a 
merger,30 some educated foresight is necessary for the preventative regulatory 
mechanism that Congress intended to create. Section 7 therefore applies 
whenever there is a "tendency toward monopoly" or a "reasonable likelihood of 
a substantial lessening of competition."31 
B. ~ifirmative Dej'ellses 
In the United States, even mergers that have effects prohibited by the 
aforementioned tests may not be restrained if the defendant successfully argues 
26 SC'e. e.g .. United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (finding a violation of Clayton 
Act section 7 when the merger resulted in a lessening of competition only in a three-state area). 
27 See United Stales v. Conn. Nat'l Bank. 41H U.S. 651> (1974); United States v. Marine BancOl'p .. 
41 H U.S. 602 ( 1974) (looking to whcrc goods wcrc actually markctcd rathcr than to thc cntirc statc). 
2H SUi iI/Ira notc 49. 
29 See FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 3X6 U.S. 56X ( 19(7). 
30 Merger regulation. especially when it deals on a thcorctical level with t()Stering future "potential-
compctition," is criticized for relying on "cphemeral possibilities" as grounds for invalidating a merger 
agreement. SC'C' i'vli/rille Bill/CO/p., 41g U.S. at 602. 623 (rcillsing to bar a merger on the grounds ofa potential 
tinure oligopoly). 
31 See United States v. Penn-Olin ('hem .. 3 n U.S. 15X, 171 (19M). 
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anyone of a number of affirmative defenses, including the "small company 
doctrine," the "failing company doctrine," lack of competitive harm, or 
economic efficiencies. 
The "small company doctrine" IS one way 111 which compal1les have 
convinced courts that strict application of the prophylactic Clayton Act section 7 
would be draconian because the net effect of the merger is to benefit competi-
tion. 32 This typically applies when small companies combine with the purpose of 
competing with larger, more dominant firms)3 In the years immediately after the 
Celler-Kefauver Amendment, companies proffering this defense did not fair well 
in the Supreme CourP4 This is changing, however.3s 
32 See FTC v. Harbor (iroup Inv" Civ. A. No. 90-2525, 1990 WL 19R819 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1990) 
(declining to apply a ",mall company defense" to the merger of two hobby telescope companies, but 
que,tioning the FTC's motives in allocating its resources to challenge the agrecment): ct: Karen Donovan, 
Illsider hadillg is Slill Big, Bill haders "~1\'e/'(/g(' .Jocs," (X NM'l. L.J" Oct. 16, 1995, at B I (describing the 
SEC's pursuit of all ca,es of insider trading, by Wall Street professionals and paralcgals alike). 
33 Cf. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (rejecting an argument similar to the 
"small company defense," when defendant bank asserted that a mcrger would allow competition in a larger 
banking market, because that defense would allow firms to merge until every finn is as large as the industry 
leader). 
34 See. e.g., United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. no (1966). 
35 The Supreme Court, in dicta, acknowledged the potential validity of this defense. SI!I! Brown Shoe 
Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962). Broll'/1 Silol! Co. is a landmark case that demonstrates U.S. merger 
regulation, both in theory and practice. Brown Shoe, the nation's third largest seller of shoes, acquired Kinney, 
the eighth largest seller. Id. at 297. Kinney's retail outlets accounted for less than two percent of the nation's 
retail salcs, but it was the large,t distributor dealing with brands other than its own. Id. Prior to the merger. 
Brown Shoe manufactured about four percent of the nation's shoes.ld. After the mcrger, the twenty-four largest 
manufacturers produced approximately thirty-five percent of the nation's shoes, with the top four producing 
twenty-three percent. Iii. The district court found a dctinite trend in shoe manufacturers purchasing retail 
outiets. Id. This had the etTect of lessening the available outlets in which independent shoe manufacturers could 
sell because the parent-manufacturers were supplying an ever-increasing percentage of their retail outlets' 
needs. Id. The district court enjoined the merger, finding that it may substantially lessen competition. in 
violation of section 7 of the Clayton Aet. Id. The Supreme Court atlinned in an opinion given by Chief Justice 
Warren, enjoining the merger. Id. First. the Court determined the relevant product market, in order to decide 
whether there was a substantial lessening of competition within the area of ctTcctive competition. Id. at 299. It 
did this first by observing the reasonable interchangeability of usc ("'cross-elasticity of demand") between the 
product itself and substitutes for it. !d. It ft)und the relevant lines of commerce to be men's, women's, and 
children's shoes.ld. Although there were certain price and quality difTcrences among the various product lines, 
the Court found efTcctive competition within each of the product markets. Iii. The parties agreed that the 
relevant geographic market was the entire United States. !d. The Court said that Congress attached particular 
importance to the purpose of the merger therefore. mergers between small companies or ofa failing company 
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The "failing company doctrine" provides that a merger between a failing 
company and one of its competitors should be allowed ifthere are no other viable 
purchasers. There is some evidence that Congress intended for the availability of 
this defeme, at least to a velY limited extent,16 and its use is growing, as it 
occupies a significant position in the DOl's Mcrger GuidelinesY This defense 
has three basic requirements: (I) the acquired company must face "imminent 
danger of failure," (2) it must have "no realistic prospect for a successful 
reorganization," and (3) it must be without any "viable alternative purchaser. "lx 
This defense is defined narrowly, the company claiming it having a strong 
burden of proof to show that it is ncarly entering bankruptcy court at the time of 
the acquisition,39 with some courts requiring present insolvency. 
is not threatening; however, in this industry. the Court found that no merger could involve a larger potential 
foreclosure because Brown would usc its ownership of Kinney to force its shoes into Kinney stores. creating a 
"vertical"' arrangement. 1<1. There was also a trend toward concentration in the industry, so enjoihing this merger 
would preserve what vigor was len and allow independent manutilcturers to compete. Id. at 305. The Court 
responded to the argument that etliciencies resulting hom the elimination of wholesalers and integrated 
manutacturing operations would save the merger as follows: 
Of course, some of the results of large integrated or chain operations arc benclicial to 
consumers. Their expansion is not rendered unlawtLiI by the merc Llcl that small 
independent stores may be adversely atrected. It is competition, not competitors, 
which the Act protects. But we cannot hlil to recognize Congress' desire to promote 
competition through the protection of viable. small, locally owned businesses. 
Congress apprcciated that occasional higher costs and prices might result from the 
maintenance of fragmented industries anu markets. II rc~olvcd thc:-.c competing 
considerations in favor of decentralizatioll. \Vc must give etfect to that dcci:-.ion. 
Id. at 344. Of course. this language runs contrary to the Chicago School approach that focuses exclusively on 
the immediate effects on consumers. rather than on the long-term clfects on the structure of the industry and 
aggregation of capital. In bct. BrowlI Sho~ Co. would likely be decided ditferently today because of heavy 
reliance on that approach. Howcver. that case deserves credit for its superior understanding of statutory intcnt 
and the broader policy of antitrust law. 
36 Although this defense is not squarcly addressed in section 7, its legislative history refers approv-
ingly to a prior case that allowed it as a very limited exception. In!'1 Shoe Co. v. FTC. 2XO U.S. 291 (1930) (in 
which the company "taced the gravc probability ofa business failure" and 110 other prospective purchasers); SCe 
also Derrick Bok, S~clioll 7 o(lhe elm'loll Act (flld Ih~ Me/gillg oj I.ml' ilild 1:'COIIOlllics, 74 H,\Rv. L. RI·\. 226. 
33947 (1960). 
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3S Dr. Pepper/Seven-Up Cos. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859. 864 65 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
39 See Citizen Publ'g Co, v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 13R39 (1969). 
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After a pnma facic case has been made against a defendant under 
Clayton Act section 7, that defendant may rebut the presumption of illegality by 
showing that no competitive harm flows from the merger. For instance, in United 
Stales \'. General Dynamics Co/'p.:+o the Supreme Court found that the acquired 
company, a coal mining business, had depicted its coal reserves and would not 
be an effective competitor even if the merger were blocked. 41 In another case, a 
flooding of competitors into the market subsequent to the merger showed that 
market power could not be maintained under the circumstances, and that the 
merger had not been a detriment to competition. 42 The narrowness of this "weak 
company" defense was illustrated, however, by the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals when it explained that such an acquisition can interfere with market 
forces and create a balTier to market entry for potential competitors:·n 
Although evidence of economic efficiencies resulting from a merger has 
historically been looked at unfavorably by courts,44 the recent trend gives this 
defense substantially more credence.45 Additionally, the 1992 DO] Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines allow for the economic efficiencies defense in horizontal 
mergers,46 and prominent commentators have suggested that more attention be 
40 415 U.S. 4R6 (1974). 
41 S~I' it!. at SO(,. 
42 Sec United Stales v. Syuly Enlers., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990). As a general rule, post-acquisi-
tion evidence showing no harm to competition is not considered as a defense because it is moslly within the 
control of the defendant and may be only temporary. S('(~ United Slates v. Cont'! Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964). 
43 SI'I' Kaiser Aluminum & ('hem. Corp. v. FTC, 652 F.2d 1324 (71h Cir. 1981) (explaining how 
such an acquisilion cfkctively hands over customers to a stronger company, preventing others hom competing 
fl.))" those customers in a way that is characteristic of a purely tree market). 
44 SI'I'. e.g.. FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). 
45 Scc FTC v. Univ. Heallh. Inc., 938 F.2d 1206. 1222 ( Illh Cir. 1991). 
4fi MrJHif'R Gl [Dj·I.I:-.JLS, supra note 22, ~ 4. 
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given to plausible efficiencies and other pro-competitive, nonrestrictive motiva-
tions for mergers and acquisitions:l7 
This conceptual overview of the U.S. merger regulatory scheme and 
Clayton Act section 7 in particular will allow for comparison with merger law in 
the Euro~an Union and Japan. For present purposes, it is fundamental to 
recognize that this merger regulation scheme has developed over a substantial 
span of time, its application requires extensive analysis of market functionality, 
and conjectural effects that often likely to ensue from increased concentrations 
of market power. FUl1hermore, many mergers are now passing muster under the 
revised standards because of a growing willingness to allow affirmative 
defenses, especially under the DOJ merger guidelines. 
III. MERGER REGULATION IN TilE EUROPEAN UNION 
From the vantage point of the United States, European Union merger 
regulation is a new and rapidly developing body of law:1S Even in these 
demanding times, the EU's doctrines and enforcement institutions have been 
surprisingly effective in analyzing the social and economic ramifications of 
business consolidation, with sophistication that greatly surpasses the early years 
47 SI!I! gl!/Ieralll' F.M. SnH:KER & DAVID Ross. INDLISTRIM, MARKI',I S 1R1iCiURE AND ECOI\OMIC 
PI:RFORMANCE 159-67 (3d cd. 1990). 
4~ The EC Treaty established the European Economic Comlllunity and was signed on March 25, 
1957, including as one of its goals "the institution of a system ensuring that cOlllpetition in the common market 
is not distorted." EC TREATY, \'Upr1l note 7 (incorporating changes made by the TRI'AI Y OF AMsrFRllAM 
A\IENDIN(; TilE TREMl' 01\ EUROPb\N UNION, TilE TREATIES Es rAIlIISIlINC; 1111, ELII{OPlA" COMMUNI rrES Al\ll 
CERTAIN RHArn) Ans, Oct. 2,1997.0..1. (C 340) 1 (1997) I hereinafter TRF.ArY 01 A\ISnRIlA,rj). 
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of Clayton Act section 7 adjudication, the predominant U.S. merger regulation 
scheme.49 
The European Union's Directorate-General for Competition of the 
Commission of the European Communities (commonly known as the 
"Competition Commission") serves as the nerve center of all EU antitrust 
enforcement, so although there have been proposals that the power to enforce the 
mcrger regulations be diffused to the national cOUJis. S1 Thc Competition 
49 Section 7. as enacted in its original form in 1914. provided: 
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the 
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation engaged 
also in commerce. where the eflcct of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen 
competition between the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such 
commerce in any section or community. or tend to create a monopoly of any line of 
commerce .... 
MILTOt\ HA"DLER ET AL., TRADE REJiLILATION R63 n.2 (4th cd. 1997). This lell many loopholcs, the most 
noteworthy of which being that it did not cover the acquisition of assets, but was limited to the acquisition of 
stock. SCI! id. at 863-64. The 1950 amendment of section 7 was intended to close this loophole, stop market 
concentration in its incipiency, begin regulating vertical and conglomerate mergers (as opposed to only 
horizontal mergers), usc tests more stringent than those employed for the Shennan Act, and allow mergers that 
would not impede commerce. Scc United States v. E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589 (1957); 
S. Rep. No. ()3 ()9X. at I (1914). A contemporary case, Ulli{ed Slates I: ColulI/hia Slecl Co .. 334 U.S. 495 
(1948). demonstrated the ineffectiveness of merger regulation and played a substantial role in the amendment 
of section 7. 
50 Scc V~I E" 11"[ K(JRAIi. AN I~ I RDilLle'lORY Gt :Iill' m EC COMPFTITION LAW ANI) PRACTICE 18 (6th 
cd. 1(97). The European Comlllission is divided by policy areas into twenty directorate generals (DGs). The 
Competition Commission was the fourth DG established. Therefore, it was formerly known as the fourth 
Directorate General. or DGIY. 1<1. "The Competition COlllmission is now composed of 20 members (two each 
from the five largest member states and one each hom the remainder). Each member of the Commission is 
responsible for one or more policy areas." 1£1. The Competition Commission is subject to substantial appellate 
review. however. by the Court of First Instance and then the European Court of Justice. SI'L' EC TREAlY art. 233 
("The institution or institutions whose ... act has been declared contrary to this Treaty shall be required to take 
the necessary measures to comply with the judgment of the Court of Justice."); Case T-II O/9S, Int'! Express 
Carriers ConI'. v. Comm 'n, 199X E.CR. 11-3605, para. 33 (finding that Article 233 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
requires the Competition Commission to comply with an FCJ decision, although that court cannot issue orders 
to the Commission. "According to settled case-law, it is not the function of the Community judicature to issue 
directions to the Community institutions or to substitutc itsclft(lr those institutions when exercising its powers 
of review. It is for the institution concerned, under Article 176 of the Treaty, to adopt thc measures required to 
give cllcct to ajudgment delivcred in an action for annulment"); Case T-7/R9, SA Hercules v. Comm'n, 1991 
E.CR. 11-1711 (stating that a reason for having the Court of First Instance is detailed review of fact and law on 
appeal from the Competition Commission). 
51 SI.'I.' White Paper on Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles gS and 86 on the EC 
Treaty, 19990.1. (C 132) I, para. 15; sel' "Iso Henriette Tielemans et ai., II CI/(/Ilged S\'s{elll: Proposcd Retimll 
O/Ellropcall COllllllissirJll Rn'ii!\\' Has Fo/"csceahle ProhiCIIIS, LEliAL TIMES, Nov. 6, 2000, at 42 (dcmonstrating 
thc controversy over the proposed changes). 
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Commission has generated much attcntion, especially in rccent years, for 
occasionally invoking competition regulations more substantial than the firmly-
established enforcement mechanisms utilized in the United States, including the 
Antitrust Division of the 001, the FTC, and the FCC 52 In 2001, for example, the 
Competition Commission blocked the proposed merger of General Electric and 
Honeywell, which had already been approved by the United States Department 
of Justice, because the Commission determined that the resultant conglomerate 
would utilize its market dominance to bundle dissimilar products and thereby 
severely reduce competition and increase prices in the aerospace industry. 53 
Competition law in the European Union was not founded on the populist 
principles of its counterpart in the United States.54 Rather, the leading goal in 
52 See. e.g .. Case 91/619, Aerospatiale-Alenia/de Havilland, 1991 0.1. (L 334) 42 (blocking the de 
Havilland/Boeing merger, although the "j"iling company defense" Was arguably applicable); H'>""'DITR, slipra 
note 49, at 99 105. 
53 Case COMP/M.2220, Gencrall'lectric/Honeywell, 20(J I 0 . .1. (L 40(4) X9 (basing the rejection of 
the merger proposal, in large part, on the conglomerate's ability to t(lrCe competitors out of the market and raise 
prices by bundling dissimilar products). The Competition Commission stated in its decision: 
The proposed merger will extend GE's incentive and ability to intluence airtrame 
manufacturers to select GE engines to Honeywell systems, and thereby t(lreclose 
Honeywell's competitors while strengthening its position on the engine markets. The 
merged entity's ability to offer packaged deals, GECAS's demonstrated and rational 
purchasing bias, the relative indifference of other aircraft customers regarding systems 
selection and GECAS's ability to place huge airerati orders arc among the main nletors 
that will enable the merged entity to etfeetively and successfully place Honeywell 
products and bundle them with GF products when appropriate. 
lei. One commentator t"voring the mergcr declared: 
The merger proposal sailed through the U.S. Department of Justice, which concluded that 
the plan did not raise competitive concerns because of the lack of overlapping markets. 
The department also found that the merged company would likely otTer bundles of 
products (e.g., engincs and radar systcms) for Icss than what the companies already 
charged for the products scparately--- hcnec customers would clearly benctil. When the 
proposal came to Brussels, the EU competition dircctoratc sharcd this view on thc 
economic ctTects of the mcrgcr. But it thcn conjectured that the lower prices would eventu-
ally drive GE-Honeywell rivals from the market and that this outcome could lead to an 
increase in prices in the future. 
See David S. Evans, The Nnl" Trlls/hlls/ers: Hi/shillg/oll IIl1d Brussels Mill" Pllr' Hill·s. FOREI(,N Arr., Jan./Feb. 
2002. 
54 Sce George Terhorst, The Re/imll(/li(J/1 of/he EC Compe/ilioll Poliry Oil Ver/ical Res/raill/s, 21 
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 343, 352 (2000). The author stated: 
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promulgating it was to foster a more cohesive market with fewer barriers and 
facilitate a better, more affordable movement of goods and services.ss The focus 
is more on economic progress, efficiency, and overall material benefit t!lan on 
the redistribution of power and corporate accountability.s6 In effect, along with 
other provisions of the EC Treaty,57 the competition law was intended to playa 
role similar to the Commerce Clause5x and the Article IV Privileges and 
Immunities ClauseS'! of the United States Constitution. 
law would lead to a greater unity among the Member States, a moral imperative after the 
bloody contlicts of the past. An economic imperative provided the second reason. The 
enterprises of the Member States of the European Economic Community ("EEC"), in a 
very weak state after the Second World War, needed to improvc their position in order to 
be bettcr able to compete with their competitors outside the Community, cspecially in the 
United States. 
Id. (citations omitted): see lIlso RICHARD MAYNI, THE RITmTRY 01 EUROPE: 1945-1973. 235 304 (1973) 
(detailing post-war attempts to integrate Europe economically aller political solutions had hliled): David .I. 
Gerber, The TrallS/iJl'l/wlio/l O/Elll'OjJ(,(I/l COllllllllllill' COllljJelilio/l LlIlI', 35 HARV. IN!'L L.J. 97,102 (1994). 
Id. 
55 See EC TREATY Art. 2. 
The Coml11unity shall have as its task, by establishing a cOl11l11on market and an 
economic and monetary union ... to promote throughout the Community a harmonious, 
balanced and sustainable development of economic activities, a high level of employ-
ment and of social protection, equality between men and women, sustainable and non-
intlationary growth, a high degree of competitiveness and convergence of economic 
perfortnancc, a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environ-
ment, the raising of the standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social 
cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
56 See Terhorst, sllpra note 54, at 353 (stating that the "twin goals set out by the Treaty for its 
antitrust regulations arc economic integration within the EC and the creation of a common markct," and 
avoiding the weakening of the competition that is created thereby). 
57 See. e.g., EC TRrMY art. 14 (setting out the internal market, in which there are to be no barriers 
to the free movement of "goods, persons, services and capital"). 
5R U.S. CONS I. art. I. cl. 3: we also Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 LJ .S. 349 ( 1951 ) (striking a city 
ordinance that required all milk sold in Madison, Wisconsin to be pasteurized within live miles of the city, on 
the grounds that it regulated interstate commerce). Justice Cardozo summarized the integrationist philosophy of 
Dormant C01l1merce Clause jurisprudence in Baldwill ". G. A. F Seelig, Ille.: 
To give entrance to [protectionism I would be to invite a speedy end of our national 
solidarity. The Constitution was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy 
less parochial in range. It was Iramed upon the theory that the peoples of the several 
states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are 
in union and not division. 
294 U.s. 511,523 ( 1935). Members of the EU arc hlr from adopting a framework of political unity that requires 
thai they "sink or swim together." as embraced in Dormant C0t11tl1CrCC Clause analysis, hut the notion of 
economic cooperation that reciprocally benefits each state individually has been appealing enough to result in 
comprehensive antitrust law. 
59 U.S. Co"s I. art. IV. cl. 2: see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 465 U.S. 
20g (19K4) (determining whether a city ordinance that favored residents in government hiring was valid). 
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The Competition Commission makes a two-step inquiry in detel111ining 
whether a merger violates Articles 81 and 82 of thc EC Treaty. The first IS 
whether the "undertaking's" proposed merger would create or strengthen a 
dominant position in the Common Market (a company is commonly refened to 
as an "undertaking" in EU jargon).60 After it is determined that there is such an 
60 51'1' Alessandro Bertolini & Francesco Parisi. Thl' Risl! of Structllralism ill EliroP1!a1l kll!lgcr 
COlltrol. 32 STAN. 1. INT'!. L. 13,20- 23 (1996). Article RI of the EC Treaty provides: 
of: 
I. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common market: all 
agreements between undertakings. decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may alfect trade between Member States and which have 
as their object or clfect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within 
the common market. and in particular those which: 
(a) directly or indirectly fix purcha:-.c or :-.c1ling pricc:-. or any other trading conditions: 
(b) limit or control production. markets, technical developmcnl, or imcstmcnl: 
(c) share markets or sources of supply; 
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading parties, 
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(c) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage. 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this article shall be automat-
ically void. 
3. The provisions of paragraph I may. however, be declared inapplicable in the case 
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings, 
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings, 
- any concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to 
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair share of 
thc resulting benclit, and which docs not: 
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which arc not indispensable to 
the attainment of these objectives; 
(b) alford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of 
a substantial part of the products in question. 
Sel! EC TREAI \' art. g I. Article 82 of the EC Treaty provides: 
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common 
market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the 
common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States. 
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in: 
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unl"ir purchase or selling prices or other unlitir 
trading cOl1dition~; 
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to the prejudice of 
consumers; 
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thcreby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; 
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which. by their nature or according to commercial usage, 
have no connection with the subject of such contracts. 
SCI! id. art. 82. 
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effect, the Commission asks whether the dominant position of the undertaking 
would adversely affect competition.!>1 
A. Creating or Strengthening a Dominant Position 
The test for dominance is a wavering standard/12 viewed on a sliding 
scale that depends on such factors as the influence that the undertaking exerts on 
the market and its ability to act independently of consumers' demands or 
competitors' actions. 6] 
From a purely economic standpoint, an undertaking with a dominant 
position can influence the market without having its actions substantially 
constrained either by competing undertakings or by consumers.64 The 
Competition Commission considers market share to be a \cading indicator of an 
undertaking's dominant positionY' This is similar to the modern practice in the 
United States.6() In Hoflinan-La Roche,()7 the European Court of Justice (ECJ) 
61 Sc(' Council Regulation 40MiX9 Establishing the Merger Control Regulation. art. 1(2), 19900..1. 
(L 257) 14, 16 (listing the Elctors that the Competition Commission considers when evaluating a merger) 
[hercinaHer European Merger Regulationsi. 
62 S('(' Sergio Baches Opi, iI4(,lg'T COlllml ill III(' Clliled Slales awll,'urope{fll Ullioll: HOlt' Should 
Ihe Ulliled Slales ·/:·..,pe/,/('Il("e 11l/lul!ll("e Ihe L'Il/orcclI/elll 0/ Iile Coullcil Moger RegulaliOl(), 61, TRANSNAr'L 
L & POL'y 223, 271 -78 (1997) (discussing the considerations for determining dominance). 
63 COli/parI! Case C-250/92, Gottrup-Klim e.a. Grovvaref()rcningcr v. Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvaresclskad AmbA, 1994 E.CR. 1-5MI, para. 47 (stating that a dominant position is "a position of 
economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to prevent clfectivc competition being 
maintaincd on the rclevant markct by giving it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independcntly of 
its compctitors, customers and ultimately its consumers"), \I'illl United Statcs v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 E2d 
416, 426 (1945) (finding 1110nopoly power under Sherman Act section 2 bceause defendant corporation "was 
free to raise its prices as it chose," regardless of a lack of specifie intent to violate the Act). 
64 Case 26175, General Motors Cont'I NV v. COl1lm'n, 1975 E.CR. 1367 (vacating the Competition 
Commission's decision for wrongly applying the stanclard for abuse of a dOl1linant position); C..I. COOK & CS. 
Kr.RSE, LC MFR(il'R CO"TR()\ 152· 56 (3d cd. 2(00) (stating that market power determines whether the firm 
occupies a dominant position). 
65 S('(' General ,\/olol'S, 1975 I'.C'.R. I J(,7; see also Case RS176, Hotlinan-La Roche & Co. A(i v. 
Comm'n. 1979 E.CR. 461. 
66 COlllpare 110tlinan-La Roche, 1979 E.C.R. 461, para. 41 (discussing the illlportance of market 
power on the issue of dominance), \I'illl United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am .. 148 F2c1 416, 424 (2d Cif. 
1945): ("'[Over ninety percent market share I is enough to constitute a 1110nopoly; it is doubttlil whether sixty or 
sixty-fi)ur per cent would be enough; and certainly thirty-three per cent is nol."). 
67 1979 E.CR. 461; also (;('//eml .Holors, 1975 E.CR. 1367. 
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found that there are very few cases in which a very large market share does not 
automatically signify a dominant position.6x Otherwise, dominant market share 
definitions will vary considerably, depending on the nature of the market in 
question. 69 In such cases, additional factors will be considered, including the 
distance in market share to the next largest competitor, market turnover, and 
technological advancesJo Some of these considerations also require assessment 
when defining the relevant market and understanding how that market will 
operate in the future. 71 
Much like merger analysis in the United States, a significant part of the 
dominance inquiry in the EU entails definition of the relevant products and 
geographic markets.?2 The Competition Commission's analysis of the supply and 
demand of products or services73 appears to be quite similar to its American 
counterpart's cross-elasticity analysisJ4 While the Commission also looks to 
68 SCI! Hollmall-La Roehl!. 1979 E.C.R. 461, paras. 40 41 (discussing the role of market "hare). 
69 See hi. paras. 42-48 (explaining that a number of considerations in the case at bar indicated a 
dominant position, rather than market share alone). In the !!o/lil/al/-La Roche case, patents and size in relation 
to the nearest competitor were Elctors that, whcn considered in conjunction with market share, indicated a 
dominant po"ition. !d. 
70 Id. 
71 See COOK, slIpra note 64, at 128 31. 
72 See Commission Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market fiJI' the Purposcs of Community 
Competition Law, art. 2,19970.1. (C 372) 5 [hcreinafkr Commission Notice[ (setting forth the guidelines fiJI' 
market definition as notice to companies); C()()~, ..... lIIJra note 64, at 132 33 (disclissing the necessity to narrowly 
dctine the market in order to foster competition and overcome legal attcmpts to eschew regulation); c/. United 
States v. E.!. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1'!56) (ddining the market rather broadly. in effect 
saying that wax paper, pliotilm, glassine. foils, grcaseproof paper, and other packaging materials were 
interchangeable because the cross-elasticity of demand was high at thc current price). 
73 Se(' Commission Notice, slIpra note 72, art. 8. 
74 See hI. For an analysis of the "cellophane h1llaey" or the deceptive character of llsing cross-
elasticity ?s a determinant of monopolization, sec Krattenmaker, slipra note 20, at 256. The Filth Circuit articu-
lated a common sense alternative to cross-elasticity analysis: 
128 
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where competition IS reasonably uniform and distinguishable from other 
markets,7:; the EU's geographic and product markets appear to be morc 
enmeshed than those found in the United States.7(, Rather than each being 
detennined in isolation of the other, the analysis consists of a single inquiry of 
effective competition. Most importantly, the Competition Commission docs not 
rely on cross-elasticity alone (or other market data in isolation) to determine 
whether there is competition in the market, as opposed to a dominant position. 
The Aleni(l/de Havilland decision shows that the Commission will ultimately 
rest its decision on the practical similarities and differences in products, from the 
point of view of the consumer rather than the economistJ7 
B. Adverse EfFect on Competition 
Taken alone, creating and/or strengthening a dominant position does not 
violate Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty. To fail under the standards applied 
Domed Stadium Hote\. Inc. v. Holiday Inns. Inc .. 732 F.2d 480. 4X7 88 (5th Cir. 1984) (citation omittcd). 
Essentially. the court lookcd at the product and its putative competition from the perspective of the consumer 
choosing what to buy in a competitive markct with competitive prices. rather than as an economist. Sec 
gel/era/il' id. Miraculously. the EU seems to havc realized the practicality of this "submarket" approach. rather 
than entrenching itself in the Scrbonian Bog of cross-elasticity analysis and its fallacies. Sec COOK. slIpra note 
M. 132--33 (discussing the Commission's use of narrow market dctinitions). If markets are dctined with an eye 
toward preserving competition and minimizing market dominance even in narrow contexts (product and 
geographic submarkets). antitrust policy will be best served. Cross-elasticity is too subject to manipulation to 
serve this purpose. especially when the economic factors considered by the courts come from a market in which 
the defendant exerts substantial control. 
75 Scc Commission Notice. SII/"." note 72. art. X. 
76 COlllpa,.e id. art. 7 9 (deriving the compound inquiry for synthesized case law and other 
opinions). H'i/II United States v. Grinnell Corp .. 384 U.S. 563. 576. 587 (1966) (deciding that the geographic 
market is national and that the product market is "insurance accredited central station protcction services." in 
separate sections of the opinion). 
77 See Case 91/619. Aerospatiale-Alcnia/de Havilland. 1991 0.1. (L 334) 42 ("A relevant product 
market comprises in particular all those products which are regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the 
consumcr. by reason of the products' characteristics. their prices and their intended usc. It would not appear. for 
example, that a 60-scat cOlllmuter is interchangeable or substitutable \vith a 30-scat COm1l1utcr. They arc used 
on routes with a significantly different density. The prices vary significantly .... "). 
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by the Competition Commission a proposed merger must also adversely affect 
competition in the common markepx 
With the exception of a few unusual cases, undertakings in the common 
market generally have little fear that their mergers will be invalidated under the 
Competition Commission's standard of scrutiny, 7l) Even when a merger fails the 
test, the undertakings generally negotiate a settlement with the Competition 
Commission by making a few modest concessions, XII Merger applications of 
undertakings in the EU are similar to those filed in the United States (in 
78 See European Merger Regulations, supra note 61, art. I () II (cstablishing the impact on the 
Community rcquired for the mcrger law to apply). There is a Community impaet if: (i) the worldwide valuc of 
thc merger exceeds five billion European Cunency Units (fOCUs), and (ii) the value within thc EU excecds two-
hundred and tiny million lOCUs. I". Howcvcr, ifover two-thirds of the IOU industry value is concentrated within 
one of the EU countries, then that country's competition laws control. Iii; see "Iso Case 27176, United Brands 
Co. & United Brands Con!,1 BV v. Comm'n, 197X E.CR. 207 (finding that the nece"ity to expend cnormous 
capital to enter a market constituted a barricr to entry). Compare Case 65 /89, BPB Indus. Pic & British Gypsum 
Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1993 E.C.R. 11-389 (finding that an exclusivc purchasing contract ti)r plasterboard was abuse 
ofa dominant position), \\"ilh SCFC ILC', Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 36 F.3d 958 ( 10th Cir. 1994) (finding that Visa's 
exclusivc dealing arrangemcnt that cxcluded Scars did not constitute an agreement in restraint of trade, in 
violation ofShemlan Act section I). CO/llpare Case 111/96, ITT Promcdia NV v. ('omm'n, 19n E.C.R. 11-2937 
(finding that predatory pricing constituted abuse), \\"irh Brooke Group v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 509 
U.S. 209 (1993) (tinding that predatory pricing could be an attempt to monopolize under Sherman Act scction 
2, but that two threshold requirements must be met: pricing bclow cost and a reasonable prospect of rccouping 
thc cxpense of predation); SCI' also Utah Pie Co. v. Cont'l Baking Co., 3~6LJ.S. 6X5 (1967) (seemingly holding 
that intcnt of predation is cnough under section 2. without meeting the threshold requiremcnts latcr ordaincd in 
Brook!' Group). 
79 S!'e LENNART RITtlcR HAL., EUROP[,AN COMPETtTloN LAW: A PRAC ttTlONoR'S GUtDE 117 (2d cd. 
20(0) (stating that the Commission overwhelmingly approvcs mcrgcr applications and that this permits a 
systcmatic derogation of the regulations). Thc Compctition Commission is also hesitant to temporarily enjoin a 
mergcr in its incipiency before a detailed review of the merits. 5iel! Case 792/79. Call1era Carc Ltd. v. Coml11'n, 
1990 E.CR. 1/9 (19X I) (finding that the Competition Commission did have the power to impose such 
measurcs, although it had fi.nmd that it did not). 
SO S!'e. e.g., Commission Decision on; July 199X Declaring a Concentration to bc Compatible with 
the Common Market and thc Functioning of thc EEA Agrccment. (Casc IV/M.I 069- WoridCon1iMCI), 1999 
OJ. (L 116) I (permitting the WoridCom/MCI mergcr upon condition of divestiture of intemet backbonc 
service from MCI); Commission Decision of 17 July 1996 Rclating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Council 
Regulation (EEC) No. 4064/89 (IV/M.553- RTLlVcronica/Endemol), art. 12, 1996 OJ. (L 294) 1.+ (requiring a 
television station not to change its t(mnat t()r five years without obtaining approval ti-tml the Competition 
Commission beforchand); see also Case 327/91, Frcnch Republic v. COl11m'n, 1994 E.CR. 1-3641 (finding that 
the European Council had thc power to cntcr into agreements with fi.)reign countries, rather than the 
Competition Commission). Bul s!'e Joined Cases 43/82 & 63/82, Vereniging ter Bevordcring van het Vlaamse 
Bockwezcn, VBVI3, & Vercniging tcr Bcvordering van dc I3clangcn des Bockhandcls, VBBB v. COl11m'n, 1984 
E.CR. 19 (holding that the Compctition Commission is not required to make settlemcnt otfers). 
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accordance with the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act),XI but the process in which they are 
reviewed is more ministerial and less adversarial. R2 When an application seems 
to violate the standards of review, the Competition Commission usually first 
looks to see what modest concession it can request in order to achieve basic, 
minimal conformity, rather than assessing its ability to trump the entire combina-
tion after protracted litigation. x3 
The Competition Commission aims to prohibit the possibility of collec-
tive dominance,s4 or the ability of a small number of undertakings in a market to 
X I Both regulations require that notifications be filed with thc cnt(Jrccmcnt agcncy (both the DO.! 
and the FTC in the United Statcs and the Competition Commission in thc EU) ifthc proposcd merger involves 
firms that meet a thrcshold sizc and othcr various rcquirements. COli/parI! Mario Siragusa. Mi!/"gi!/" COillmi alld 
Shill! Aids Pllllel: Ml'lgl'r COillroi ill II", El/roPl!llll COlI/lIl/lI/ill', 9 CONN, J. INT'!. L. 535, 539A2 (1994) 
(cxplaining pre-file notification in thc EU), lI'illl 15 U.s.C ~ I Ra; HANDLeR, slIpra note 49, app, B, 39 
(summarizing Titlc II of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvcments Act of 1976), 
X2 SI!I! J. DA\'If) BANKS, MFR(/cR LAW AND POI ICY IN Till' UNIIH) KIM/f)OM, Al!STRALi;\ AND 
Et!ROl'cAN COMMLNI ry 200 02 (1999) (explaining how thc Competition Commission obtains scttlements in 
most cases, on account of its tlexibility), The process of review is considercd to bc f~lr from cumbcrsome, See, 
<'g, .!oincd Cases T-305 /94. T-30(,/94, 1~307:94, T-31 3/94, T-31 (,194, 1~3 I Xi94, T-32S/94, T-32X/94, T-329/94 
& T-33S194, Limburgsc Vinyl Maatschappij NV, ElfAtochcm SA, BASI' AU, Shellln!,1 (,helll. ('0. Ltd., DSM 
NV and DSM Kunststotlen BV, Wacker- ChemiC GmbH, Hocchst AG, Societe artcsienne dc vinylc, 
Montedison SpA, Impcrial Chem. Indus. Pic, Husls AG and Enichem SpA v. Comm'n, 1999 E.CR. 11-931, 
para. 1021 (finding that the companies wcrc entitlcd to acccss to the case file and that denial of such right by 
the Competition Commission had a probable effect on the Commission's dccision); Case 53/XS, AKZO Chemic 
BVandAKSOChelllieUKLtd.v.('olllm'n, 19X6E.CR. I%S,rI9X6J I C.M.L.R.231 (1987) (finding that the 
Competition Commission could not subpoena documents that could be used against that company later in a 
different court). Bill S('~ Case 301n, Distillers Co. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 6 E.CR. 2229, 119801 3 CM.L.R, 121 
(19XO), para. 26 (finding that procedural irregularities were harmless error and therefore unnecessary to 
review); Joined Cases 209 215 & 21 Ri7S, Heintz van Landcwyck Sari & Others v. ('omm 'n, 1980 E,C.R. 3125, 
II nO] 3 CM.L..R. 134 (1980), para. 47 (finding procedural irregularities 10 be harmless crror); Case 48 /69, 
Imperial Chem Indus. Ltd. v. COlllm'n, 1972 E.CR. 619 (finding no procedural violation when the delivery of 
minutes from a hearing was delayed). 
83 See, e.g., Commission Decision of 8 July 1998 Declaring a Concentration to be Compatible with 
the Common Market and the Functioning of the EEA Agreemcnt (Case IV/M.1069-WorldCOIl1!MCI), 1999 OJ. 
(L 116) I (permitting the colossal merger on the condilion that MCI sell an internct baekbonc service); 
Commission Decision of 17 July 1996 Relating to a Proceeding Pursuant to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 
40()4, ~9 (IV/M ,553 - RTLIVeronica/Endcmol), 1996 0.1. I L 2l)4) 14 (discussing COlllmission approval in a 
television station case) Bill S~~ Casc COMP/M,2220, (Jencral Elcctric:HoneywC\l, 2001 0..1. (L 40(4) 89 
(blocking a merger that had becn approved by the U.S. Departmcnt of Justice, discussed slIpm note 53). 
84 See Joined Cases C 68/94 & C 30/95, France v. C ()mm' n, 1998 E.C .R. 1-1375 (finding that collec-
tive or oligopolistic dominance vvas covered by the competition law). 
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conduct business in an anticompetitive manner. X5 This is tantamount to the fear 
of oligopolistic conduct that reverberates throughout United States antitrust 
law,x6 including interdependent conscious parallelism,x7 price leadership,xx and 
other collusive tendencies among a few parties, against which merger control is 
aimed. In assessing the likelihood of collective dominance after a merger, the 
Competition Commission looks to the "degree of concentration, price 
transparency, product homogeneity, cost symmetry, slow market growth, barriers 
to entry, [and] structural links."x9 These factors arc nearly identical to those 
considered by Professor Stephen C. Salop in assessing the potential for price 
coordination in an oligopolistic market, in the context of American antitrust 
law. 90 
The concept of collective dominance is controversial because it presup-
poses that undertakings will act in an anticompetitive manner. Additionally. the 
gS "In an oligopoly market ... each I finn I must consider the clfect of his output on the total market 
and the probable reactions of the other sellers to his decisions; the results of their combined decisions may 
approximate the protit-maximizing decisions of a monopolist.'· RCf!Or/ or Ilw Whilc /lOIISC Task Force oil 
Alllilrusl Policr (1968), 2 AN IIfRlIST LAW & ELON. REV. II, 22 (Win. 1968-(9) I hereinatier Whilc f/OIlSI! 
RCf!Orl]. BlIlscc SCHeRER, slIl'ra note 47, at 151 ("Some oligopolistic industries appcar to maintain prices 
approximating those a pure monopolist would tind most protitable. Others gravitate toward price warfare"). 
86 SI!I! While HOllse Rq)(}rl. sllf!ra note 85, at 22 30; SCIIERER, slIf!ra note 47, at 266. 
87 See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977): Donald F. Turner, The Definilion of 
Agreemenl Under Ihe Sherman Act: COIISciolls Parallelism and Refitsals /() Deal, 75 H-\RV. L. Rlv. 655, 663 66 
(1962). This is dctined as the "conduct of a party who has knowledge of a competitor's course of action and 
who makes la] decision to take the same actions .... " BLACK'S LA\\ DICIIO"ARY 126 (3d cd. 1998). The net 
eftCct is that the tirms will systematically raise prices because each trusts that the others will do the same t(1r 
collective protit maximization. 
88 See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.s. 20K (1939). 
89 Commissioner Mario Monti, The Alain C/wllcngcs .fiJI' a Nell' Decade or [,'C Moger ('ottlml, 
Address at EC Merger Control Tenth Anniversary ContCrence, Brussels (Sept. 15,20(0). 
90 SI!C HANDLI'R, slIpra note 49, at 520 27. 
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concept allows for a merger to be enjoined when merging companies have a 
combined market share that is less than monopolistic (dominant) by itself.9l 
Nevertheless, it is evident that the Competition Commission is less willing than 
United States enforcement agencies to assume that companies will collude if 
given the chanee.92 
C. Affirll/ative Defenses 
In sharp contrast to modem merger regulation in the United States, the 
Competition Commission does not consider possible efficiencies that will result 
from a merger.93 It is generally thought that regardless of the definition of 
"dominant position," there is no place for efficiency considerations in the 
inquiry.94 This doubtlessly saves time and expense in the litigation process, but 
subjects the review to criticism by firms that proffer substantial cost-saving 
reasons for merger.9:' 
The European Union's closest equivalent to the United States' "small 
company defense" is the delegation of local antitrust enforcement to member 
91 See Thomas Mueller. Whlll fi,l/Ties MOllli: Nell' Ecollomv ('ollel'ms IIrI! Dril'illg Ihe Ellropeall 
L'lIio/l 10 Strieler Sentlilll', 23 Uri"l TIMI:S, Nov, 6, 2000, 35, at 35 36 (giving a rudimentary explanation of 
market concentration/conspiracy theory and its speculative underpinnings), 
92 Compare Joined Cases C 6X/94 & C 30/95. France v, Comm'n, 199X E,c'R, 1-1375 (discussing 
the application of collcctivc dominance when a few linns had market control with the potentiality of collusion 
to raise prices), 1I'/Ih Boise Cascade Corp, v, FTC, 637 F,2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (declining to enforce an FTC 
order to prevent the explicitly agreed upon standardization of freight charges among finns in the highly concen-
trated plywood industry); see II/SO Maple Flooring Mtrs, Ass'n v, United States, 268 U,S, 563 (1925) (allowing 
a series of industry standardization agreements and in/(mllation sharing in the highly concentrated rough lumher 
producing industry); Ethyl Corp, v, FTC, 729 F.2d In ( 19X4) (declining to enforce an FTC order that required 
defendant companies to cease to engage in a number of activities that were highly suggestive of collusion, such 
as agreements with customers not to raise prices, in the highly concentrated lead antiknock industry), 
93 Sec .I'llI'm notes 44 47 and accompanying text; Thomas L. Greaney, Not{il/' Imporl: Whl' Ihe EU 
Sholl/d Nol Adopi Ihe Americall EI/iciellcl' l)eli'llse liJr Alla/l'~illg Me/gers IIlId Joillt Vellillres, 44 S 1, LOlliS U, 
U, 871. 884 89 (2000), 
94 See it!, 
95 Sec HANDLER, sll/1m note 49, at 1042, 
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states according to each state's own competition laws.96 Similarly, the United 
States historically left local antitrust matters to its individual states when they 
were of wholly local concel11, not affecting interstate or foreign commerce.97 
Therefore, the small company defense is functionally unavailable in the EU as 
even the smallest companies must comply with the merger regulations, so long 
as a respective localities' threshold for community impact warrants Competition 
Commission intervention. 
Likewise, a "failing company defense" IS not available as a separate 
affirmative defense; however, it could be difficult for the Competition 
Commission to show that a firm occupies a dominant position or that a larger 
firm's dominant position is strengthened by a merger involving a practically 
insolvent finn.9X 
The above analysis of EU merger regulation shows that the analysis is 
quite literal in determining the existence and abuse of a dominant position, with 
less willingness to imply a right to any atTirmativc defenses that merging firms 
might proffer. However, the Competition Commission seems eager to reach a 
settlement with the interested parties and looks to the harm done directly to 
96 The Merger Regulation applies only to mergers of '"Community dimension.'" hi. at 1043. The 
combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned must be morc than live billion ECUs 
(over $6.25 billion), and where the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two ofthc undertak-
ings concerned is more than 250 ECUs, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than two-
thirds of its turnover in only one member state. fd. at 1043 44. 
97 Se(', ('.g., Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat'l Leaguc, 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (linding that bascball did not 
qualify as interstate commerce); Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.s. 25K (1972) (acknowledging the irrationality of 
Fedcml B{/seh,,1/ CllIh, but according it stare decisis elfect); Minnesota Twins P'ship v. Milwaukce Brcwcrs 
Baseball Club, Ltd" 592 N.W.2d X47 (Minn. 1999). 
98 See . .."upra notes 36 39 and accompanying text. E:-,tablishing dominance i:-. a threshold inquiry, 
rathcr than an atfirmativc defensc. Scc id. 
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consumers and smaller competitors in the marketplace, rather than to strict 
economic data, to find an acceptable compromise. 
IV. MERGER REGULATION IN JAPAN 
Japanese competition law began at the end of World War II as part of an 
attempt to reconstruct the economy and make commerce fair and dependable. 99 
Before that time, the government actively promoted monopolies and cartels, 
encouraging the aggregation of capital in large businesses which were, coinci-
dentally, often closely connected with the government. 100 Zaibatsu, Japan's giant, 
politically powerful conglomerates, were popularly considered to be the driving 
force of the eeonomy.IOI The four largest zaibatsu, Mitsui, Mitsubishi, 
Sumitomo, and Yasuda, controlled about one fourth of all the paid-up capital in 
the Japanese economy before the Second World War. I02 "What's good for 
Mitsubishi is good for Japan" was all the justification that conglomerates gave 
for pushing out competition and making their market domination more comfort-
able. I03 
99 HIROSHI hORI & AKI'JORI UISI'(d, TilE AN II~IONOPOLY LAWS Of JAPAN II (1983). 
100/d. 
101 Glen S. Fukushima, Cor!'o/we 1'0l1'('/', ill DFMOCRACY IN .I.·\p;\'J 255 (Takeshi Ishida & I'liis S. 
Krauss cds .. 1989); Alex Y. Seita & .Iiro Tamura. The IIi,,/oric,,/ Bockgrolllld oj.!o!,oll.' AII/iIllOIlOpO/)' L(/\I', U. 
ILL. L. RrY. 115, 150 (1994). 
102 A'JTIMO'JOpOI Y L.HilSL·\IION 01 .L\p;\N 301 (Masanao Nakagawa cd .. 1984). 
103 During the 1950s. the phrase "what's good Il)r General Motors is good Il)r America," was 
enough to appease the United States public, even in light of monopolization, corporate \\'elnlre, and othcr untllir 
trade practices. See ROBERt RI'll'Il, TilE WORK Of NATIONS; PRFPARIN(; OURSElVES FOR 21ST-CENTURY 
C\I'I rAI ISM 42 (Vintage cd. 1992) (1991). "Gradually, (he top exccutives of America's largest corporations 
would come to view thcmselvcs as 'corporatc statesmen,' responsible Ii.)r balancing the claims of stockholders, 
cmployees, and the American public. Surprisingly, the public would come to share this view." Id. "By thc 1950s, 
the well-being of individual citizens, the prosperity of the nation. and the success of the nation's core corpora-
tions seemed inextricably connected. Most of the larger questions about the role of the giant corporation in 
American society had been rcsolved." Id. at 43. When President Eisenhower appointed Charles Wilson 10 be 
the Secretary of Defense, Wilson stated at the Senate contirmation hearing: 
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A. History of the Antimonopoly Act 
Japan's remedy to thc anticompctitivc naturc of thc conglomcratcs was 
thc "economic constitution,"lo~ the Antimonopoly Act of 1947 (AMA),I05 which 
was bascd specifically on the American Sherman Act, Clayton Act, and Federal 
Tradc Commission Act. 10(, Thc AMA strictly controlled mcrgcrs and acquisitions, 
prohibited Japanese firms from unrcasonably aggrcgating cconomic powcr in thc 
market, and only contained a few narrow exemptions. 107 The Act made cartels 
illegal per se and crcatcd thc Japanesc Fair Trade Commission (JFTC), a largcly 
indepcndent agcncy charged with administering the law across the country. lOX 
However, the JFTC relaxed its enforccment soon thereafter, lOt) and in 
1953 the governmcnt amended the AMA in a program called "Reverse Course," 
which loosened the per se cartcl prohibition, rclaxing mcrgcr and acquisition 
provisions, abolishing the prohibition of unreasonable differences in economic 
powcr, while only prohibiting substantial cm1cls. llo The major impetus for this 
I cannot conceive of [making a decision fiJr the public interest of the United States 
that would be adverse to (iM\ interests [ because for years I thought what was good 
fiJr our country was good for General Motors. and vice versa. The di ffcrence did not 
exist. Our company is too big. It goes with the welfare of the country. 
!d. at 47 48 (citing Confirmation Hearings on Charles E. Wi bon as Secretary of Defense Before the Senate 
Comm. on Anned Services (Feb. 18, 1953)). The Bush Administration seems to be reviving this attitude of 
corporate patemalism in its own Justice Department's antitrust enforcement. S'(,(, Robert H. Lande, 5'-li//('(/ SjJiril 
o/ComjJ('lilioll: TlI'o Proposed i'v/ollopo/i('s Mm' .Voll/ik(' Pric('s. 8111 Ther '//I/lirl COlIslimers. D·\IL\ RIP .• Oct. 
3, 2002, at 9. 
104 MI (SLID MAtSUSHITA. 1'1 (ROlJU('TlON TO J .\I'A'IISI·: AN lIVIONOl'lJlY L\\\' 2 ( 1990). 
105 lei.; Shiteki Dokusen no Kinshi oyobi Kousei Torihiki no Kakuho ni Kansurtl Houritsu [AMA /. 
Law No. 54 of 1947. 
106 MAiSlISHI'IA, supra note 104, at 2. 
I07Id. 
108 1<1. MIl'HIKO ARIC;A, CO~II'UIIION L.\ws Of nil' P·YlIIll RI~I: JAPAN at .lAP ~ 3.n I (1991). 
109 MAISI;SHII;\, supra note 104. at 3. 
110 Id. MICHAEL SCHALleR, ALI Ll{lolJ SIAl loS: THe UNII HJ SIAl loS ANLJ JAI'/\'1 SINCe 1m. Onld'AIIU'I 
16 17 (1997). In 1952 and 1953, the Japanese politicians and businesses were securing various exemptions 
from the Antimonopoly Act, including those fllr small and medium enterprise cartels, depression cartels, natural 
monopolies. resale price maintenance agreements, export and import cartels, transportation cartels, insurance 
cartels. and cartels deeding with one of many commodities. See AMA ~~ 21 23. 
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relaxation was the United States government's usc of its political clout to revive 
the zaibatsu in an effort to create internal stability instead of competition, to 
combat communist forces in the region. II I Although the United States was the 
original proponent of the AMA,112 its goal shifted to centralizing economic 
power, "even at the cost of reducing living standards"II' for the Japanese people. 
Of course, these amendments resulted in price manipulation, collusion 
and all of the detriments that antitrust law is supposed to prevent. In response, 
the government again amended the AMA in 1977 to control monopolistic 
conditions in the market and to require that reports be filed with the JFTC to 
justify price increases in oligopolistic markets. 114 Since these amendments, the 
AMA has helped to foster more of the competitive fairness that was its original 
aim.lls More recently, Japan established a department in the Ministry of 
Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) in 2000, making the department respon-
sible for strengthening competition policy. One commentator explained how this 
came about: 
The more than decade-long economic slump following the 
collapse of the bubble economy in 1989 induced these attitu-
dinal changes. Japanese businesses and the government both 
realized that the structural weakness in Japan's economy lies 
in the industrial sectors secluded from competition (most 
notably the financial, construction, retail, and electricity 
III MATSUSIlIlA. slIpm notc 104. at 3: MITSIJO MATSLISHIIA, INTeRNATIONAL TRADe AND 
COMPF II riO!,; LAW IN JAP.~~ 79 ( 1993). 
112 Allcr World War II, thc U.S. Dcpartmcnts of \Var and State instructed General Douglas 
MacArthur, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan (SCAP). to increasc competition in the 
market in the reconstruction ctl()rt. SCI! SeliAI I fol{. sl/pm note 110, at 12. 
1131d. at 17 (citing PeRCY JOHNS roN HAl., REPORI ON TilE EeO!,;()Mle POSITION AND PROSPECTS Oe 
JAPAN AND KORlcA AND TilL MFASllRfoS RE()IIIRU) TO IMPROVF TIIEM, released Apr. 26, 1948, rl!prillied ill JOSEPH 
DODGE PAPERS (availablc in thc Dctroit Public Library). 
114 M ~TSlIS"ITA, slIpra note 104, at 4. 
115 1r1. 
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sectors). In this rcgard, M ichacl Portcr observed 111 an 
innuential book: "Few roles of government are more 
imp0l1ant to the upgrading of an economy than ensuring 
vigorous domestic rivalry." Japan's government and a large 
portion of its business community finally have come to share 
this view. 116 
From an analysis of the foregoing history of Japanese antitrust law, it 
appears that Japanese antitrust law falls somewhere between the politically 
motivated foundations of the American scheme and the economically oriented 
European one. Although the Antimonopoly Act was originally enacted to 
dismantle politically powerful industrial giants, the zaibatsu, lackluster enforce-
ment clearly indicated that the popular momentum of the Sherman Act never 
existed in full force in Japan. Consumer protection and allocative efficiency 
ideals have only entered the Antimonopoly Act in the last decade or so, but they 
have pushed that law to the forefront of commercial policy in a more significant 
way than the political motivations ever could. 117 
B. Model'll Regula/Ofy Framework 
Today, the AMA regulates the following commercial activities: (I) it 
prohibits private monopolization and the unreasonable restraint of trade; (2) it 
prohibits cartels unless a certain exception applies; II x (3) it generally prohibits 
116 See MIl'IIAEL E. POIUER, TilE COMPElITIVl ADVA'-'IA(;!c ()} NMIONS 662 (1990). Porter's advice 
is of much utility to any country whose "bubble economy" collapses, whether Japan's in 1989 or Amcrica's in 
2003. 
117 See Robert Thomson, Japan :\. Carlel BlISlers Slarl 10 (jel Tough, FIN. TI,lIcS, Apr. 3, 1991, ~ I, 
at 6 (quoting Tsuyoshi Motonaga, director of the JI·'Ie's cartel investigation division, as saying: "People arc 
afraid of us now. We, the police, and the tax agency arc the bodies that Japanese companies don't want to 
antagonise Isiel."). 
II ~ The number of exempted cartels has drastically !allen as Japanese competition law has become 
more sophisticated. In 1lJ66 there were 1079 exempted cartels, compared to titleen in 1999. SI!I! 1'1 t I·Rr>;AIIONM. 
BAR ASS()CIArI()'I. GUlflAI COM PHI nON F()RlIfvt, al http://www.globaicompetitiont(Jrllm.org/ (last visited 
March 14,20(5). 
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unfair business activities; and (4) it restricts holding eompal11cs, interlocking 
directorates, stoekholdings, and the merger or acquisition of business assets 
which may substantially restrict competition. I 19 
The AMA will restrain a merger or acquisition of stock 120 if the transac-
tion will substantially restrain competition in a particular field or trade, or if the 
securing of the merger entailed unfair business practices. 121 The JFTC defines a 
"substantial restraint" quantitatively, using twenty-five percent as a guideline for 
an allowable post-merger market share. If the market share is anticipated to be 
above twenty-five percent of the industry, the JFTC will subject it to the review 
process. ln 
As far as market analysis and affirmative defenses are concerned, Japan 
seems to follow, in large pa1i, the American model. m Specifics are not entirely 
clear because the summaries published by the JFTC often lack detail and leave 
companies with little understanding of what is prohibited and what is 1101. 124 
119 ARI(;A. slII'ra note lOX. at .lAP ~ 4.02: IVORI & UFSLl;I, slII'ra note 99, at 41: MATsLsHlrA, slII'ra 
note 104. at 5. 
120 MAfSl;SflIIA, slIpra note 104, at 3(). 
121 IvORI & UI·.SIIt;I, supra note 99, at 85 (citingAMA ~ 15(1)). 
122 MATSlISflllA, slII'ra note 104, at I h. The AMA sets a pre-merger notification requirement under 
which every company in Japan, regardless of its size, must notify the JFTC thirty days bct'Jre it intends to 
merge. Id. (citing AMA ~ 15(2)). The following hlctors will be reviewed most with each notification: (I) 
whether the post-merger market share will be over twenty-five percent of the relevant market: (2) whether the 
post-merger company will be ranked first in the industry and have a markct share of fiftecn percent or more: 
and (3) whether the post-merger company will have the largest market share in the industry with "a conspicu-
ously large market share relative to the second and third ranked companics." Id. at 35-3(). 
123 See Toshiaki Takigawa. Thl! Pmsfll!cI orAlllilmsl La\\' al/(I Polin' ill Ihl! 7irelllr-Firsl COllur\,: 
III RI'/erl!lIcl! 10 Ihe '/al'allesl! Alllil/lO/wI'olr L£I1\' alld J"I'all Fair Trade Commissioll, I WASH. U. GrOIlAL STUD. 
L. REI. 275, 27981 (comparing the analyses under the Shennan Act and the AMA, but noting that the .IFTC 
does not condemn a collaboration until significant market power is actually found). 
124 See AMA ~ 2(9): .I0S!PII \V. S. DAVIS, DISl'll\1 RLSOII!llON IN JAPAN 56 (199h): Curtis J. 
Milhaupt. A Relaliollal Theon' of '/a/}(/I/esl! ('orl'ol'llll! COl'l!l'I/lIIlce: COlllracl, CIIII/Wl! alld Ille Rille o/Lall', 37 
H YRY·. I" 1'1 L.J. 3, 29 (1996): Takchisa Nakagawa, Adlllillislralit'e IlIfiJl'll/illil.'· ill JapillI: GOI'el'l/lIIl!1I1 Aclil'ilics 
Olll.,ide SlilllilOfT .·llIlhori:illioll, 52 A[)~,JIi'<. L. RI\,. 175, 179, 1 H3 (2000). 
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Japanese companies, however seem to proffer a broad range of justifications for 
increasing market share, which are either accepted or at least taken into account 
for mitigation purposes.1 25 
Similarly, the JFTC has not fully avoided falling into the trap of the 
cellophane fallacy. It makes cursory reference to the use of cross-elasticity of 
demand in the market analysis area of its review process: 
Any particular field of trade means the market. It is generally 
defined by the extent to which a merger may affect competi-
tion, taking into consideration specific factors found in the 
cases such as the types of goods and services handled by the 
merged company, the geographical extent to which such 
goods and services are to be traded, and the specific phase of 
transaction (manufacture, wholesalc, retail, etc.). 
Competition is substantially restrained by a merger when the 
market structure changes as a result of a merger and specific 
companies can control the market by freely influencing to a 
certain extent the price, quality, quantity and other terms with 
their own intention. The judgment on whether a particular 
merger is unlawful is made by comprehensively taking into 
account various competitive factors. 126 
Of course, because so few mergers have been subjected to the full public 
transparency of the courtroom, it is difficult to tell how much importance cross-
elasticity actually plays in the analysis. 127 At least it appears, from the language 
of the above policy statement, that the JFTC will account for the whole gamut of 
considerations in defining the relevant market and will not, as the U.S. Supreme 
125 S~~ DAVIS, slIpra note 124, at 56.; HIROYLIKI HATA & Go NAKA(;A\\A, CONSIHlIIIO'lAI LAW Of 
JAPAN 91 -92 (1997). Japan has decided to make its competition decisions more public and to increase the 
calculation of civil fines ("surcharges") to cut back on the informalities that were making its laws so inetlec-
live. Akinori Yamada, Remarks at the Global Economic Devciopment and Competition Policy Conference 
(Mar. 17. 1997) (rcmarks available at http://www2jtic.gojp/c-pagc/policyupdalcs;spccchcs;97-0303.hlml) (\asl 
visited Apr. 22 20(5). 
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126 See IN i"cR'IArIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION, Slipi'll note II X. 
127 See Milhaupt, Slipi'll notc 124, at 29. 
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Court did in Ullited States v. £.1. dll POllt de Nemours & Co.,m or as the FTC 
Guidelines do as a matter of course, stop the analysis simply because cross-
elasticity of demand exists. 
C. The Commission:5 Struggle to Enlorce 
AMA section 17(2) allows the JFTC to take "necessary measures" to 
eliminate mergers and acquisitions regulations violations. 129 One such measure 
is to declare null and void a merger or acquisition that violates the Act; uo in fact, 
unless the combination is entered into in good faith, it is automatically null and 
void, even without JFTC action. III Additionally, monetary and criminal penalties 
are available, including sentences up to one year of imprisonment. m Finally, the 
AMA provides private parties with standing to bring a civil suit if they have been 
injured by violations of the AMA. m Injured parties have an automatic right of 
indemnity from a violator of the Act l34 but do not have the right to collect treble 
damages. 
While enforcement may sound serious enough to effectuate the compet-
itive policies of the Antimonopoly Act, the penalties lack real substance and bite. 
12R 351 U.s. 377 (1956). 
129 IYORI & Ub.Sl·(d. s"pra note 99, at XX. The JFTC investigates approximately two hundred cases 
per year and applies at least some quantum of enforcement against approximately thirty cases per year. Shogo 
hoda. Remarks at a Meeting Organized by the Royal Institute of International AtTairs 3 (Feb. 22, 20(0), 
http://www..iftc.admix.go.jp/e-page/speeeh/20000222.htm (last visited Feb. 25, 20(5). 
130 IYORI & UlcSU(il, s"pra note 99, at 88 (citing AMA ~ 18). 
131 /11. (citing Yokoi Sangyo Co. v. Shirokiya Co., 3 KTIS 537 (Tokyo High Ct. 1955)). However, 
it appears that if there is no action or court decision that nullities a merger or acquisition. there is no other means 
of eliminating it. S('(' M[()'1(iCHO YAN(i, COMPErllloN LAWS OF THE PACIfiC Rlvl: REPUBLIC OF KORE.\ (SOVIH 
KOREA) SK 5 17 ( 1991 ). 
132 hORI & UESlI(il, supra note 99, at XX (citing Yokoi Sallgro, 3 KTIS 537). 
133 ARlliA, s"pra note 1 OX, at JAP 17-1: .1('(' also AMA ~ 25. The right to claim damages bascd on 
this section cannot be pursued until aner the ./FTC reaches a conclusive decision. I". ~~ 25. 8485. 
134 I". (citing AMA ~ 2S( 1 )). 
141 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
Indeed, businesses may look at the fines as merely the cost of doing business 
rather than something that will substantially affect the structure of their 
industries. If the assets of the post-merger company total less than twenty-three 
million U.S. dollars, the JFTC will, as a matter of practice, not challenge it. 
Furthermore, the penalty for a violation by a company of that size cannot exceed 
ninety thousand U.S. dollars.") Companies with such extraordinary assets 
obviously would consider that amount of money to be both insignificant and 
irrelevant in deciding whether to proceed with a merger. In addition, there have 
been very few private actions in Japan against violators because, quite simply, 
the claimant never wins. 136 There arc no treble or even punitive damages 
available, there are no class action suits, discovery is extremely limited,137 the 
amount of proof needed to show a violation is prohibitive, and litigation costs arc 
exceptionally high. 13X Some commentators opine: "A business executive consid-
ering fixing prices in Japan has practically nothing to lose.""'! Enforcement is 
such a problem that in the last twenty years the JFTC has only challenged a few 
mergers and prohibited none of them, allowing incrcased concentration of 
135 MATSLJSlllrA, slipm note 104, at 36. 
136.1. Mark Ramseyer, The Cosls o(I/1I! COI/.I'ellslw/ A1I-1h: Alllilrusl EII/iJrCeIllCIII alld IllSlilliliolla/ 
Barriers 10 Liligalioll ill ./apall, 94 YAII', L..l, 604, 617 (19X5) ("No private antitrust damage claimant has ever 
prevailed in court in .lapan,"), 
137 Interrogatories, requests for admission, and depositions arc simply unavailable, and document 
production requires specitic document identitication, holder identitication, a summary of its contcnts, a 
statement of the fact intendcd to be proven with the document, and other proof" See Noblltoshi Yamanollchi & 
Samuel .I. Cohen, UJl(/erslalldillg 1/1I! IlIci'{C!lIcC! o(Litigalioll ill./apall: A Slrucllll'll/ Alla/rsil', 25 11\ r'L LAI\ HI{ 
443.444-47 (1991). 
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139 Ramseyer, slipra note 136, at 635. 
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market power in the country's largest companies and the consequent suppression 
of competition. 140 
Japan presently faces a decisive moment in time. It must decide whether 
it is going to take the ditlicult stcps of revitalizing competition by breaking up 
and trimming down the conglomerates that survive from the zaibatsu era, or 
whether it will continue to shelter them and persist with the sluggishness that the 
Japanese economy exudes as a result. Investor confidence and innovative forces 
depend on Japan's ability to secure new sources of competition and they will not 
reappear until the JFTC delivers on its commitment. 
V. LESSONS BY COMPARATIVE EXAMPLE 
The foregoing background infonnation is not enough to comprehen-
sively evaluate the benefits and shOltcomings of all methods of merger regula-
tion. However, a few crucial lessons are evident. 
A. The Dual Pwpose o/Alllill'llst Law is Political and Economic ill Scope 
The historical and philosophical underpinnings of these divergent 
systems cannot be changed by a simple act of Congress or by an amendment to 
the Commission's Merger Regulations or Japan's Antimonopoly Act. However, 
the purpose of any legislation may change over time and refined policy is useful 
in creating new laws and interpreting old ones to meet present-day needs. The 
JFTC, the Competition Commission, and the appellate EU courts must all 
understand the importance of antitrust law, not only in preserving low prices, 
market competition, and consumer welfare, but also in assuring that large 
140 MMSl;SHIIA, supra note 104, at 35 36. 
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businesses, which are generally unaccountable to various constituencies, do not 
exercise unbridled control in markets upon which the public is dependent. 141 
Moreover, the United States should renew its commitment to these goals 
(including the responsible distribution of industrial power and the diversification 
of national wealth) after more than a generation of deference to the Chicago 
School approach, which supposed that economic policy alone was sufficient to 
protect public interests. 142 In spite of the 1890 legislative intent, businesses have 
primarily grown in size rather than in number, creating a perpetual "bigness" that 
results in large, unmanageable abuses. United States courts usually appreciate 
the necessity of fostering competition in a market ceonomy; it is the political 
underpinnings that must be revisited. 
B. Searching for Abuse of'a Dominant Position or a Substantial Lessening or 
Restriction of' Competition 
United States courts usually appreciate the necessity of fostering 
competition in a market economy; it is the political underpinnings that must be 
revisited. United States courts have simply been outdone by the Competition 
Commission in the market power inquiry. EU competition law has mostly 
avoided the cellophane fallacy by combining geographic and product market 
analysis, utilizing market data, and searching for "areas of effective competition" 
from the perspective of consumers, 143 Indeed, data that indicates that consumers 
141 SI!I! s"pra notes I 0 II and accompanying text (discussing the importance of corporate account-
ability and its role in antilrust policy). 
142 SI!I! Herbert Hovenkamp, Ill/tilrust Po/iCl'A/kr ('''iel/go, X4 MicH. L. RL\ 213.213 III (19~S) 
("The Chicago School model of antitrust policy dictates that allocative etlicieney as dclined by the market 
should be the only goal of the antitrust laws."). 
143 Scc supra notes 76, 77. and accompanying text (dcmoll~tratil1g: how th(",; Competition 
Commission has avoided the Cellophane Fallacy and rclined its market dclinition analysis). 
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would change products if cellophanc increased in price by five percent is 
relevant and w0l1hy of consideration, but pretending that this settles the market 
power question is pure sophistry. The whole business context must be incorpo~ 
rated into the analysis. 144 
Japan's position on this issue is unclear, mostly because of the lack of 
transparency in JFTC decision-making, which is a problem in itself. However, 
the JFTC policy statement shows that a diverse array of factors are important to 
it, so it probably resembles the superior EU approach more than the American 
one. 
Reluctance of U.S. courts to engage 111 independent market analysis, 
united with elasticity data, seems to come from a fear of judicial activism. 
Economists' expert opinions are preferred over common sense detenninations of 
effective competition between products because resting a decision on the former 
is ostensibly more objective. Judges are appointed, however, to exercise 
judgment. It is simply a dereliction of this responsibility to eschew these 
important questions and rely instead on data that is patently misleading. 
Economists rely on assumptions 111 formulating models so that their subject 
matter is more understandable, assumptions for which courts must be watchful 
when entrusted with cases that are "among the most important in public law."145 
Cross-elasticity analysis relics on the assumption of an uncontrolled market so it 
144 See slIpra notes n 92 and accompanying text (discussing market EU market analysis in the 
context of collective dominance). 
145 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 652 ( 1985) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting) ("The Sherman and Clayton IIcts rctlect Congress' appraisal of the value of economic treedom: 
they guarantee the vitality of the entrepreneurial spirit. Questions arising under these Acts arc among the most 
important in public law."). 
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is of little use when control over the market is the crux of the inquiry. Courts in 
the United States, Japan, and the EU all probably realize this, but EU courts 
exercise judgment in deciding practical interchangeability, rather than evading 
that task for fear of being labeled sUbjective or judicially active. 
Conversely, the Competition Commission must be watchful for "collec-
tive dominance." It has been careful not to assume that abuse will ensue automat-
ically from an oligopolistic market, but this runs contrary to what is known about 
that kind of market structure. 146 United States courts generally assume that 
market concentration among a few firms will havc anticompetitive 
consequences, which results in a policy of forestalling market concentration in 
its incipiency, even before explicit abuses arise. 147 The Commission must 
consider a standard that prevents potential abuse of a dominant position, rather 
than actual abuse. While this requires it to forecast the condition of future 
markets, merger regulation is inherently conjectural; when these questions go 
unanswered it is at the expensc of consumers, small competitors, and the public 
at large. 14x 
Japan's broad analysis of market structure provides an essential starting 
point for reasoned competition analysis because it welcomes a host of important 
wealth concentration and consumer welfare considerations. This is refreshing, 
but what the JFTC gains in open-endedness upfront, it surely lacks in subs tan-
146 See slipra note 72 and accompanying text. 
147 See id. 
14X s('(! slipra notes 2X 31 and accompanying text (dcmonstrating thc ncccs",rily conjccturalnaturc 
of 111crgcr regulation). 
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tive standards against which mergers are subsequently required to measure up. 
More specificity should be a paramount goal, both in the policy statements and 
published decisions, which will aid predictability and competition over the long 
run. 
C Efficiencies and Other Affirmative Defenses 
In the last few decades in the United States, the efficiencies defense has 
led to an approval of mergers that substantially increased market concentration 
and has made enforcement of merger regulations exponentially more expensive. 
Indeed, most enforcement efforts require extensive compilation of market 
information and protracted litigation. 149 This begs two questions in the United 
States: (I) whether Congress intended such efficiencies to supersede its explicit 
policy against mergers that "may substantially lessen competition;" and (2) 
whether the expense and complexities of this defense should be accommodated 
when already overcomplicated analysis makes merger regulation so onerous. 
Only the latter is relevant to the EU in deciding whether to entertain the etlicien-
cies defcnse in the future. Many commentators opine that market power 
fragmentation is more valuable than creating efficiencies in numerous cases, and 
that in all other cases the efficiencies hardly justify the misleading and costly 
effects that the defense has on merger litigation. ISO 
149 See slIpra notes 44 47 and accompanying text (discussing the etliciencies defense in the United 
States); slIpra note 94 and accompanying text (citing an article that argues that this defense should not be 
a\ailable in the EU). 
150 See iii. 
147 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW Spring 2005 
One practical solution to this problem is to allow cOUlis and agencies to 
consider efficiencies after the prima facie ease is made against the merger, but 
also to require the defendant company to absorb the financial expenses associ-
ated with that defense, including, inter alia, the gathering of necessary informa-
tion, court costs, and costs incurred by the enforcement agency in evaluating the 
information. Companies would likely incur these expenses only when the 
efficiencies are meritorious and substantial, rather than using the defense to deter 
law enforcement when the real objective of the merger is the acquisition of 
market power. 
The U.S. Congress intended to strike the balance in favor of competitive 
forces, even at the expense of some efficiencies, a fact largely forgotten by U.S. 
courts. lSI The EU seems to have embraced the same policy and has adhered to it 
more devotedly. While this avoids the extensive costs and convoluted litigation 
that typically flows from the defense, there is a legitimate fear that highly 
efficient conglomerations will be enjoined from mergers when their efTect on the 
competitiveness of the marketplace is de minimis. The EU would do well to 
reconsider its policy, but only to an extent that does not significantly impair the 
Commission's ability to enforce the plain language of its regulations. 
151 See SIiJi/'(/ note 35 (discussing the BrOlI'll Shoe case. which arliculated this principle). Judge 
Lcarned Hand articulated the unequivocal mandate of Congress as t(,ilows: 
Truc. it might havc becn thought adcquate to condcmn only those monopolies which 
could not show that they had excrciscd the highest po"iblc ingcnuity. had adopted 
every possible economy, had anticipated every conceivable improvcment. stimulated 
every possible dcmand. No doubt. that would he onc way of dealing with the malter. 
although it would ilnply cOIl~lanl ~crutiny and constant supervision, ~uch as courts arc 
unable to provide. Be that as it may, that was not the way that Congress chose; it did 
not condone "good trus!s" and condcmn "bad" oncs; it t(,rbade all. 
United Statcs v. Aluminum Co. of Am .. 14S F.2d 416. 427 (2d Cir. 1945). 
148 
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The "small company" and "failing company" defenses have played 
similar roles in the United States and the European Union, although the EU 
seems to have approached both of them more pragmatically by looking to the 
entire business context rather than merely at the firm's particular disposition. The 
merger of a small company into a gigantic one, for instance, can obliterate any 
remaining competition in a highly concentrated market, while the merger of two 
small companies in a market with vigorous competition can be mutually benefi-
cial and efficient, while having no appreciable effect on market prices and 
market power. Likewise, even a failing company may have recapitalization 
options that will provide needed competition in future markets, while the assets 
of a purely insolvent firm may best be used by a former competitor through the 
merger process. 
The EU system allows these defenses to arise in the prosecutorial discre-
tion of the Competition Commission, while the U.S. courts entertain them as an 
affirmative defense after finding a possible substantial lessening of competition. 
The latter approach is probably superior bccause it applies the standard 
evenhandedly, although the FTC and DOJ doubtlessly have wide discretion in 
deciding which cases to pursue, and consider these defenses in that process. In 
summary, merger regulations must give all companies an equal opportunity to 
submit these arguments, but must not construe them broadly enough that 
opportunistic accounting firms might create financial statements to sustain such 
defenses when they do not reasonably apply. 
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The JFTC can learn, especially from the American experience, that all 
companies will use these defenses to avoid enforcement; in fact, it has already 
had a similar experience and responded by cutting cartel exemptions to a signif-
icant extent. This is one lesson worth remembering. 
D. Enforcement Procedllre 
All three systems confront a common endeavor in the enforcement of 
their respective merger regulations: none can enforce the law in all cases to 
which it is applicable because enforcement agencies lack the resources to review 
and challenge all suspect proposals. Private enforcement of merger regulations 
is difficult because no one individual is likC\y to incur significant financial 
damage from the merger itself, only trom consequent abuses of market power. 
Litigation of these issues burdens the agencies with significant expense and no 
opportunity for recuperation, a set of circumstances that is particularly 
conducive to apathy and inctTectiveness. 
In addition, post-merger lawsuits based on monopolization are hardly 
effective because of the inherent difficulty of untangling two merged companies. 
Understandably, courts are often unwilling to cause the kind of dislUption that 
accompanies disjoining conglomerates, and often prefer the course of permis-
siveness rather than strict enforcement of the law. 
Prior to the consummation of a merger is the decision to merge, which 
generally constitutes a conspiracy in restraint of trade or an agreement to abuse 
a dominant position, provided that it violates the merger regulations of the 
relevant nation. Eaeh system might consider the imposition of monetary 
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penalties for such conspiracies or agreements 111 order to recoup enforcement 
expenses. Such penalties might bc based upon the size of the proposed merger or 
the degree of market concentration potentially created by it. 152 
Additionally, such penalties might be available only to agencies that are 
presently entrusted with merger regulation or private firms with the entrepre-
neurial spirit to enforce the law privately. This is not an unknown concept in the 
United States, notably in the context of section 16 of the 1934 SEC Act, the 
prohibition on short swing trading of securities. I;;) To be a plaintiff in the context 
of section 16(b), one only need be a shareholder at the time of the lawsuit.lS~ 
Fears that plaintiffs' firms will meet this 0ppOliunity with frivolous lawsuits 
might be quelled by securities-for-expense statutes, which would require them to 
post a bond that would satisfy the defendant's expenses in the event that the court 
finds that the case is either without merit or brought in bad faith. 
152 This is a relatively easy calculation, known as the Herlindahl-Hirschman Index ("'HHI'"), used 
extensively by the FTC and OOJ ill deciding whether to challenge a merger. See M,R(;ER CilJIDELI!'>ES, S//pra 
note 22 ~~ 1.5, 1.51. 
153 See gelleralh' Robert W. Hamilton, CO/II'erlible Secllrilies alld Sl!cli(J/l /o(b): Till! Ell(/ o/w/ Era, 
44 TEx. L. REV. 1447 (1966). 
154 SCI! iiI. at 1450 n.1 X. In the United States at least, there is 3n issue regarding the constitutionality 
of allowing a cause of action to proceed when monetary damages, as opposed to injunctive relief, arc 
constructed on this basis, rather than on a measure of loss actually sulTered. The Supreme Court has indicated 
that although Congress might express its intention to confer a cause of action, a statutory grant of standing does 
not excuse a plaintillfrom demonstrating injury in fact. Sce Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 
(1992). In LII/(///, the Court rejected plaintiffs' claim of standing in environmental litigation based on the 
statutory provision that entitled "'any person I toJ commence a civil suit on his own behalf ... to enjoin any 
person, including the United States and any other governmental instrumentality or agency ... who is alleged to 
be in violation of any provision of this Act.'" Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.c. ~ I 540(g)( I) (20(JO). The Court 
reasoned: 
To permit Congress to convert Ihe undilTcrentiated public interest in executive 
officers' compliance \\ ith Ihe law into an ""individual righl" vindicable in the court' 
is to permit Congre" to Iransfer 1[0111 the President to the courts the Chicf 
Executive's most important constitutional duty, to ""take Care that the Laws be 
t~lithfully executed." 
Llljall, 504 U.S. at 577 (Scalia, .I.); se~ a/so Allen v. Wright, 46R U.S. 737,750 (19R4) (stating that the doctrine 
of standing delines separation of powers for the judicial branch); Antonin Scalia, Th~ Doclrill~ o{Slalldillg as 
w/ Es,\'(,lllial Demelll "flh" S~/}(//'(/li()11 ojl'o1l'('rs, 17 Sur'l 01 K U. L. RFv. gg I (19X3); THE hDl'RALIST No. 78, 
at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter cd., 19(1) (suggesling that the judiciary is the "'least dangerous" 
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The EU is unlikely to embrace any such private enforcement scheme 
when even the most egregious cases of price-fixing, tying, and division of 
markets are not subject to private enforcement. However, it may become easier 
for the EU to learn by example when its Competition Commission becomes 
increasingly overwhelmed by merger applications which it lacks the resources to 
appropriately inspect. 
Seemingly, Japan already has in place a scheme to challenge mergers 
through private litigation, though damages are not available beforehand. Yet, 
the change required in the Japanese system to accommodate effective private 
suits is more fundamental. In fact, the Japanese culture itself may be the most 
formidable barrier, as the people do not view private litigation as a means of 
branch of the United States government because it "has no intluence over either the sword or the purse"). 
Another Supreme Court opinion elaborated on the standing doctrinc: 
[A] party seeking to invoke a federal court"s jurisdiction must demonstrate three 
things: (I) "injury in hlet," by which we mean an invasion of a legally protected 
interest that is "(a) concrete and particularized. and (b) actual or imminent, not 
conjectural or hypothetical:' (2) a causal relationship between the injury and the 
challenged conduct, by which we mean that the injury "fairly can be traced to the 
challenged action of the defendant," and has not resulted "Irom the independent 
action of some third party not before the court." and (3) a likelihood that the injury 
will be redressed by a hlvorable decision, by which we mean that the "prospect of 
obtaining relief Irom the injury as a result of a lavorable ruling" is not "too specula-
tive." 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Gen. Contractors of Am. v. City of Jacksolwille, 50g U.S. 656, 663 64 (1993) 
(citations omitted). However, a plaintiff suing under a scheme that prevents mergers and prO\ ides a monctary 
incentive for bringing suit might liken hi~ case to a Tariff Act section JJ7 actioll, which doc:-, not require proof 
of injury to bar merchandise from importation on account of the tact that it violates a U.S. citizen's intellectual 
property rights. Sec Andrew S. Newman, Tile AIIII'I/dll/ellis to Sectioll 337: Illcreased Protectioll /i}/'llItel/f'cllIal 
Propertl" Rights, 20 LAW & PO!'y I~T'L Bl;S. 571 (19g9). Under that statute, injury is presumed to occur if the 
court does not provide a remedy before the importation is allowed by U.S. Customs. 1£1. Standing requirements 
do not seelll to be as prohibitive under European Union law. For example, articles 22 and 23 of the [U Privacy 
Directive allow private citizens to sue for civil penalties if a business violates any of the substantive provisions 
of the Directive. Council Directive 95/46!EC'. arts. 22 23, 1995 O.J. (L 2g I ) 31. Article 22 provides: 
Without prejudice to any administrative remedy Illr which provision Illay be made, 
inter alia bct(ll'C the supervisory authority. , . Member States shall provide for the 
right of every person to a judicial remedy Illr any breach of the rights guaranteed him 
by the national law applicable to the processing in question. 
Id. art. 22. Presumably this applies to proactive, not just reactive, civil actions, and actual damages Illay be 
recoverable in the tllrlll of attorney fees or otherwise, which are generally available to the winning party in civil 
law countries. 
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industrial change, but as a limited and often discouraged means of private 
recourse for damages already suffered. Unfortunately, unless the Japanese arc 
willing to rethink this settled public conception, they will rely indefinitely on 
the toothless machinery of the JFTC to bring full competition into their 
markets 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The United States should utilize the European experience and revitalize 
its merger regulation by adopting the superior method of defining markets (and 
understanding the limitations of economic data), simplifying the efficiencies 
defense, and better appreciating the business context in which a merger takes 
place. Japan and the EU have already gained much from the American perspec-
tive but might look to the political underpinnings of the Sherman Act and 
Clayton Act if they seck to use antitrust law for greater purposes. This means 
could be used as a device to integrate politically as well as economically for the 
EU, and to reshape industrial markets and competition for Japan. The manner in 
which each system deals with other issues, such as the problems of enforcement, 
will provide the others with lessons in the future. Learning by example is not an 
affront to sovereignty or forfeiture of self-governance. It is an empowering 
process that presents alternatives for purposes of remedying societal ills. 
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